Discussion Papers

• „Freedom – Why? A Mechanism Design Approach“, July 2023, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 18281. Version July 10, 2023.
• „Locally optimal trans­fer free mechanisms for border dispute settlement“, first version: March 2022, second version: February 2023, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17142.
• „The Value of Choice – Evidence from an Incentivized Survey Experiment“ (with Linnéa Rohde), July 2022, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17425.
• „Minority Protection in Voting Mechanisms – Experimental Evidence“ (with Dirk Engelmann, Timo Hoffmann, and Alex Possajennikov), February 2020, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14393.
• “Externalities, Institutions and Public Perception: The Political Economy of European Integration Revisited”, European Commission, European Economy, Economic Papers, 2017 Discussion Paper 057, July 2017.

• "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games“, (with Dirk Engelmann), July 2013, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9544. CESifo Working Paper No. 6405.
• „The Political Economy of Structural Reform and Fiscal Consolidation Revisited“, April 2013, European Economy, Economic Papers 487.

• „Fiscal Policy and Growth: Do Financial Crises Make a Difference?“, (with António Afonso and Christina Kolerus), June 2010, ECB Working Paper, No. 1217.
• „Capital Markets, Information Aggregation and Inequality: Theory and Experimental Evidence“, CEPR Dicussion Paper No. 6750. abstract
• „Safety Nets against Corruption“, (with Mike Felgenhauer), October 2008, for an earlier version of this paper see CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6317. abstract

• „Protocol Design and (De-)centralization“, March 2007, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6357. abstract

• „Welfare Effects of Cross-Border Financial Integration“, (with Falko Fecht and Philipp Hartmann), 2006. abstract
• „Financial Integration and Systemic Risk“, (with Falko Fecht), 2005. Discussion Paper 11, Frankfurt am Main: Dt. Bundes­bank.
• „Wealth Distribution and Interest Rates: Empirical Evidence for the US“, Okt. 2001, Universität Mannheim, CEPR discussion paper No. 3106. abstract
• „On the Role of Conflicting National Interests in the ECB-Council“, 1998, revised March 2000 and January 2001, University of Bonn, SFB 303 Discussion paper No. A-584 , CEPR discussion paper No 2192. abstract
   

Articles

• [49] „Herausforderungen für die Außen­wirtschafts­politik und die Wirtschafts­politik im Inland“, Perspektiven der Wirtschafts­politik, 2021, 22(3), 211–216
• [48] „Economic Growth and Political Extremism“ (with Markus Brückner), Public Choice, 2020, 185, 131–159.
• [47] „Linear voting rules“, (with Thomas Tröger), Econometrica, 2019, 87, 2037–2077.
• [46] „Crowdfunding, Efficiency, and Inequality“, (with Christoph Siemroth), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019, 17, 1393-1427.
• [45] „Sozialismus auf Kredit“, Ifo Schnelldienst, 14/2019, 12–14.
• [44] „Die politische Zukunft von Hartz IV“, Ifo Schnelldienst, 6/2019, 18–21.
• [43]  „Mechanisms for the Control of Fiscal Deficits“, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 2017, 144, 133–152.
• [42]  „Measuring Political Information Rents: Evidence from the European Agricultural Reform“, (with Daniel Müller), European Journal of Political Economy, 43, 2016, 107–126.

• [41]  „Bankenunion: Teil einer finanz- und fiskalpolitischen Strategie für Europa“, Perspektiven der Wirtschafts­politik, 2013, 14, 219–233.

• [40]  „Financial Integration, Specialization and Systemic Risk“ (with Falko Fecht and Philipp Hartmann), Journal of International Economics, 2012, 88,1, 150–161.

• [39]  „Public Goods, Participation Constraints, and Democracy: A Possibility Theorem“ (with Yukio Koriyama),  Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 2012, 152–167.

• [38]  „Not a Good Fit: The European Banking Authority's New Capital Requirements and the EFSF“, (with Daniel P. Müller): CESifo Forum 2011, 4, 18–22.

• [37]  „Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for Information Provision“, (with Elisabeth Schulte), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 76, 2010, 734–747.

• [36]  „Wealth Inequality and Credit Markets: Evidence from Three Industrialized Countries“, with Markus Brückner and Kerstin Gerling,  Journal of Economic Growth, 15, 2010, 155–176. Online Appendix to Table 6, JOEG revision 2010 USA, UK, SWEDEN.

• [35]  „Why EMU is not a Failure“, European Journal of Political Economy, 2009, 26, 1–11.

• [34]  „Information Technology, Efficient Restructuring and the Productivity Puzzle“, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, 2009, 916–929.

• [33]  „Unions, Wage Setting and Monetary Policy Uncertainty“ (with Bernd Hayo and Carsten Hefeker), The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 40. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol9/iss1/art40.

• [32]  „Wirtschafts­politik nach der Finanz­krise“, Wirtschafts­dienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts­politik, 10, 175–188.

• [31]  „Bad Bank: Eine Alternative“, (with Falko Fecht), Ifo Schnelldienst, 2009, 13 3-7.

• [30]  „Kapitalbeteiligung von Mitarbeitern: eine Bewertung der jüngsten Vorschläge“, Perspektiven der Wirtschafts­politik, 10, 175–188.

• [29]  „Inequality and Political Consensus“, Theory and Decision, 2009, 67, 239–265.

• [28]  „Reliability of Information Aggregation with Regional Biases“, (with Martina Behm),  Theory and Decision, Volume 66, Issue 4 (2009), Page 355.

• [27]  „Limits to International Banking Consolidation“, (with Falko Fecht),  Open Economies Review, 2008, 19,  651–666.

• [26]  „Wissenschaft, Demokratie und Reform“, Wirtschafts­dienst , 2008.

• [25]  „Committees and Special Interests“, (with Mike Felgenhauer), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10, 219–243. (previous version:  ECB working paper No. 293.)

• [24]  „Distortionary Lobbying“, (with Mike Felgenhauer), Economics of Governance, 2007, 8, 181–195.

• [23]  „The Political Economy of Wealth and Interest“ (with Rüdiger Schils), Economic Journal, 2007, 117, 1403-1422.

• [22]  „Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing“, (with Elisabeth Schulte),  Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 2007, 138–154.

• [21]  „Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey“, (with Kerstin Gerling, Alexandra Kiel and Elisabeth Schulte), European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 2005, 563–597.

• [20]  „Collective Decisions with Interdependent Valuations“ (with Alexandra Kiel), European Economic Review, 48, 2004, 1147-1168.

• [19]  „Redistribution as a Selection Device“, Journal of Economic Theory, 108, 2003, pp. 194–216.

• [18]  „Unemployment and Labor-market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach ", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4), December 2002, pp. 641–656.

• [17]  „How much Should Central Banks Talk: A New Argument“, Economics Letters, 77 (2), 2002, pp. 195–198.

• [16]  „Der Preis der Arbeits­markt­reform“, Wirtschafts­dienst, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts­politik, Heft 3, März 2002, pp. 141–144.

• [15]  „Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution“ (with Giacomo Corneo), Journal of Public Economics, 83 , January 2002, pp. 83–107.

• [14]  „Social Limits to Redistribution“ (with Giacomo Corneo), American Economic Review, 90, December 2000, pp.1491-1507.

• [13]  „A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy“ (with Angelo Artale), Games and Economic Behavior, 33 (1), October 2000, pp. 20–40.

• [12]  „Optimal Flat-Rate Taxes on Capital: A Reexamination of Lucas' Supply-Side Model“ (with Burkhard Heer), Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 2000, pp. 289–305.

• [11]  „How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?“ (with Carsten Hefeker), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101 (1), 1999, pp. 33–47.

• [10]  „Einige Anmerkungen zu den Determinanten wirtschaft­licher Stabilität“, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts­politik, 47, 1998, pp. 20–41.

• [9]  „A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy when Central Bankers Have Private Objectives“, Public Choice, 62, 1997, pp. 172–193.

• [8]  „Monetary Policy, Reputation and Hysteresis“, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozial­wissenschaften, 166, 1996, pp. 15–29.

• [7]  „Bank Cooperation and Banking Policy in a Monetary Union: a Political Economy Perspective on EMU“ (with Carsten Hefeker), Open Economies Review, 7 (3), 1996, pp. 183–198.

• [6]  „Redistributive Policy, Inequality and Growth“, Journal of Economics, 62 (1), 1995, pp. 1–23.

• [5]  „Zentralbankglaubwürdigkeit und Insider-Macht: Empirische Evidenz (Central Bank Credibility and Insider Power: (Empirical Evidence)“, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 214 , 1995, pp. 385–400.

• [4]  „Domestic Pressures and the Exchange Rate Regime: why Economically Bad Decisions are Politically Popular“ (with Carsten Hefeker), Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 194, 1995, pp. 331–350.

• [3]  „Lösungs­möglichkeiten des Zeitinkonsistenz­problems in der Geldpolitik“, Homo Oeconomicus, 12 (3/4), 1995, pp. 455–479.

• [2]  „Evolutionary Stability of Social Norms in a Socioeconomic Equilibrium Model“, Constitutional Political Economy, 6 (3), 1995, pp. 233–245.

• [1]  „Taxation of Income and Wealth in a Model of Endogenous Growth“ (with Burkhard Heer), Public Finance, 49 (3), 1994, pp. 358–373.

Contributions to edited Volumes

• [10]  „Financial Globalization and Stability“ with Falko Fecht and Philipp Hartmann, in Evanoff, Hoelscher, Kaufman, eds: Globalization and Systemic Risk, (Proceedings of a conference cosponsered by the Chicago Fed and the IMF), World Scientific, Singapore.
• [9]  „Mechanism Design: Die beste Allokation“. Das Wirtschafts­studium (WISU), 36. Jg., Nr. 11, 2007.
• [8]  „Verdienste um die mikro­ökonomische Fundierung der Makroökonomik”, (on the Nobel prize 2006), Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Kreditwesen, 2006.
• [7]  “Financial Integration through the Interbank Market – Stability and Welfare Implications“ (with Falko Fecht) in : K. Liebscher, Christl, J., Mooslechner, P., Ritberger-Gruenwald, D., (eds.) Financial Development, Integration and Stability: Evidence from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Edward Elgar, 2006.
• [6]  “Contract Theoretic Analysis of International Negotiation Systems“ in Eibe Riedel, Dirk Hanschel, eds.: Institutionalization of International Negotiation Systems, MZES, 2005.
• [5]  „Informations­aggregation in internationalen Verhandlungen und Organisationen.“ in Die Institutionalisierung internationaler Verhandlungen, Mannheimer Jahrbuch für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2004, III, 92–109.
• [4]  Comment on: Roger Guesnerie „The Government and Market Expectations“ in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 2000, 157, 127–129.
• [3]  „Chancengleicheitspolitik: eine vertragstheoretische Analyse“, erscheint in Schriften des Wirtschafts­wissenschaft­lichen Seminars Ottobeuren.
• [2]  „Verteilung und Fiskus: Die Aus­wirkung der Einkommensbesteuerung auf die Einkommensverteilung“ Kommentar zu Klaus Müller und Chr. Bork in H. Hesse, B. Gahlen and H.J. Ramser eds.,Zunehmende Ungleichheit, Erklärungen und Konsequenzen, 1998, JCB Mohr, Tübingen.
• [1]  „Mechanism Design for Central Banks – Results and Unsolved Issues“, Comment on Gerhard Illing in W. Wagner, ed. Current Issues in Monetary Economics, 1998, Physica, Heidelberg.

Diploma thesis, PhD-thesis, Habilitations­schrift, Book

• Allgemeines Temporäres Gleichgewicht mit Mengenrationierung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Werkes von Benassy Diploma thesis, University of Heidelberg, 1989.
• Crédibilité des banques centrales et salaires nominaux en Europe: analyse théorique et résultats empiriques, Thèse de Doctorat, E.H.E.S.S., Paris, 1993, Fichier National des Thèses.
• The Economics of Distributive Politics, Habilitations­schrift, University of Bonn, June 1998.
• Wirtschafts­politik, Allokations­theoretische Grundlagen und politisch-ökonomische Analyse, (Textbook on economic policy), Springer Gabler Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, first edition 2001, second edition 2006, third edition 2008, fourth edition 2012, fifth edition 2017, sixth edition 2018, seventh edition 2019, eight edition 2022.

Book reviews

• Roy Gardner, Games for Business and Economics, Ken Binmore, Fun and Games and Jürgen Eichberger, Game Theory for Economists, in European Journal of Political Economy, 12 (1996), 157–159