Prof. Dr. Bernhard Ganglmair

• Expectations of Reciprocity when Competitors Share Information: Experimental Evidence (with Alex Holcomb and Noah Myung)
  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 170, 2020 (February), pp. 244–267 [Link]
• Installment Contracts and Material Breach
  Supreme Court Economic Review, 26, 2018, pp. 1–46 (lead article) [Link]
• Efficient Material Breach of Contract
  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 33(3), 2017 (August), pp. 507–540 [Link]
• Adversarial Decision-Making: Choosing Between Models Constructed by Interested Parties (with Luke Froeb and Steven Tschantz)
  Journal of Law and Economics, 59(3), 2016 (August), pp. 527–548 [Link]
• Conversation with Secrets (with Emanuele Tarantino)
  RAND Journal of Economics, 45(2), 2014 (Summer), pp. 273–302 [Link]
• Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation (with Luke Froeb and Greg Werden)
  Journal of Industrial Economics, 60(2), 2012 (June), pp. 249–273 [Link]

• Technology Economics: Innovation, Licensing, and Antitrust (with Greg Werden, Luke Froeb, and Steven Tschantz)
  In: Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy, chapter 5, pp. 192–219, November 2020 [Link]
• Price Markups, Innovation, and Productivity: Evidence from Germany (with Nadine Hahn, Michael Hellwig, Alexander Kann, Bettina Peters, and Ilona Tsanko)
  Report for the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, Germany, July 2020 [Link]

• Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation in Standards Development (with Timothy Simcoe and Emanuele Tarantino)
  NBER Working Paper 24358
• The Effect of Patent Litigation Insurance: Theory and Evidence from NPEs (with Christian Helmers and Brian Love)
  CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper 196/2020
• Visibility of Technology and Cumulative Innovation: Evidence from Trade Secrets Laws (with Imke Reimers)
  CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper 119/2019
• Markups for Consumers (with Alex Kann and Ilona Tsanko)
  CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper 282/2021
• Representation is Not Sufficient for Selecting Gender Diversity (with Justus Baron, Nicola Persico, Timothy Simcoe, and Emanuele Tarantino)
  NBER Working Paper 28649

This course covers topics on the economics of innovation for PhD students. Topics include the following:

• Intellectual property:
  The institutions and the economics of different forms of intellectual property (patents, copyright, trade secrets), including questions of optimal design of intellectual property and firms’ optimal IP strategy.
• Incentives to invest:
  Models (and evidence) to understand how monetary and non-monetary incentives shape firms' and entrepreneurs' decisions to innovate and invest in R&D. Relations­hip between competition and investment/innovation and the functioning of prizes, contests, and grants.
• Licensing, joint ventures, and open innovation:
  Innovators' decisions to license their intellectual property to both competitors and non-competitors. Competitors' decisions to form a joint venture and collaboratively develop technologies while competing in the market place. Open innovation. Competition policy concerns about licensing and joint ventures.
• Network effects and technology standard development:
  Networks, network effects, and two models of standard development: (1) standard wars, and (2) collaborative standardization (a form of co-opetition).

Basic (and background) textbook is “Innovation and Incentives” by Suzanne Scotchmer (MIT Press 2004). In addition, handbook chapters and research articles are assigned to supplement the material in the textbook for a more thorough treatment of the topics or for topics not covered in the textbook.

The lecture focuses on theoretical aspects of the economics of innovation. The empirical side of the course topics is covered by means of short student presentations. Each student is expected to present short summaries of two to three papers in class.

This course gives an introduction to the economics of innovation. It provides an overview of the traditional literature and recent extensions, linking the theory to its empirical applications. The list of topics includes: monetary and non-monetary incentives to innovate; intellectual property and its optimal design; secrecy and disclosure of information; open innovation; economics of science; technology standardization; R&D and public policy. The aim is to provide students with the knowledge of the standard theoretical and empirical models and approaches and introduce them to modern research questions.

This course covers basic methodology and theory of industrial organization. The aim is to make students of competition law familiar with the methodology of competition economics. This requires some formal analy-sis. Basic models of markets in which firms enjoy market power are presented and key competition policy concerns are addressed. In the second part, key competition policy concerns are addressed. This includes cartels; horizontal mergers; predation, monopolisation, and other abusive practices; vertical restraints and vertical mergers.

Die Veranstaltung vermittelt quantitativ-methodische und theoretische Grund­kenntnisse der Ökonomik. Hierzu werden mathematische Grundlagen der Analysis (Differential- und Integralrechnung) und der Wahr-scheinlichkeits­theorie aufgefrischt und vertieft. Auf dieser Grundlage führt die Veranstaltung in grundlegen-de Konzepte der ökonomischen Entscheidungs­theorie, der Spieltheorie, der Preistheorie und der Ökonometrie ein.