# Self-selection and Endogenous Entry in Experimental Games

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## Message from the Guest Editors

Dear Colleagues,

The large body of experimental research on behavior in games has provided invaluable insights into the general principles of strategic thinking, the role of fairness and social preferences, and the predictive power of various equilibrium concepts. Naturally, most of this work restricts attention to games with set payoffs and a fixed number of players. While there is a body of literature on multi-stage settings in which the players themselves choose which game to play, or whether to play at all, it is still relatively small. However, in many naturally-occurring settings, self-selection is extremely important. Multiple questions arise from such scenarios. Like what drives the players' decisions? How does self-selection affect strategic behavior, and how does this evolve over time? Who chooses which type of game? Are there lessons to be learned for the design of experiments more generally? For this Special Issue, we invite papers that use experimental methods to examine these and other questions relating to strategic behavior when self-selection and endogenous entry are relevant forces.

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# Special Issue