

## Understanding the income gradient in college attendance in Mexico: The role of heterogeneity in expected returns

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Differences in college enrollment between poor and rich are striking in Latin America. Explanations such as differences in college preparedness and credit constraints have been advanced. An alternative explanation could be differences in information sets between poor and rich, for example, about career opportunities, translating into different expected returns to college. Poor people might expect low returns and thus decide not to attend or they might face high (unobserved) costs that prevent them from attending despite high expected returns. I use data on people's subjective expectations of returns to address this identification problem. I find that poor individuals require higher expected returns to be induced to attend college than individuals from rich families. Testing predictions of a model of college attendance shows that poor individuals are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs, which is consistent with them being credit constrained. Performing counterfactual policy experiments, I find that a sizeable fraction of poor individuals would change their decision in response to a reduction in direct costs and that these individuals at the margin have expected returns that are as high or higher than the individuals already attending college.

**KEYWORDS.** Schooling choice, credit constraints, subjective expectations, marginal returns to schooling, local instrumental variables approach, Mexico.

**JEL CLASSIFICATION.** I21, I22, I38, O15, O16.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Differences in college enrollment rates between poor and rich individuals are a prevalent phenomenon, but particularly striking in Latin America. In Mexico, the country that is the focus of this paper, the richest 20% represent around 60% of the student body (compared to 45% in the United States), while the poorest 40% constitute only 8% (compared to 20% in the United States). In addition, overall college enrollment is low in Mexico.<sup>1</sup> These empirical facts might reflect an important welfare loss if returns to education are high, but poor people cannot take advantage of them, for example, because they are credit constrained.

A traditional explanation for the income gradient in college attendance is credit constraints. Credit market imperfections are a likely scenario in the case of human capital investments given the lack of collateral (since human capital is embodied in the person) and moral hazard problems (for example, in terms of work effort to repay the loan). Suppose that credit markets are indeed imperfect in that banks only lend to individuals with collateral. Since college attendance involves direct costs (such as tuition and costs of living), individuals from poor families, who are unable to cover such costs with parental income, might choose not to attend college even in the presence of high expected returns, since they are unable to borrow (or can only borrow under less favorable conditions than the rich).<sup>2</sup> An alternative explanation for the gradient is that it may be optimal for poor individuals not to attend college, even if they could borrow to finance higher education, because of low returns from human capital investment.

One explanation that has been neglected in this analysis consists of differences in information sets between the poor and the rich, for example, about career opportunities, translating into different perceptions of individual returns to college. Conditional on their information sets, poor people might expect low returns and thus decide not to attend or they might face high (unobserved) costs that prevent them from attending despite high expected returns. This constitutes an important identification problem, because expected returns are not directly observable.

There are two ways in which this identification problem can be addressed. The first option is to reconstruct expectations from the observable (ex post) outcomes. This approach departs from an assumption that is a corner stone of most economic models: individuals' ex ante expectations about their ex post outcomes are (in an expectation

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<sup>1</sup>A strong correlation between children's educational attainment and parental resources has been documented for many countries (see, e.g., the cross-country overview of Blossfeldt and Shavit (1993)). The correlation is particularly strong for developing countries (see, e.g., Behrman, Gaviria, and Szekely (2002) on Latin America). In the Supplement (available in a supplementary file on the journal website, <http://qeconomics.org/supp/259/supplement.pdf>), I compare Latin American countries, the United States, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in terms of attendance rates, inequality in access to higher education, and availability of fellowship and student loan programs, and I give detailed background information on costs and financing of college attendance in Mexico.

<sup>2</sup>Conventionally, an individual is defined as credit constrained if she would be willing to write a contract in which she could credibly commit to paying back the loan ("enslave herself in the case of default"), taking into account the riskiness of future income streams and of default. Since such contracts are illegal, banks may choose to lend only (or to give much more favorable conditions) to individuals who offer collateral.

sense) correct (given their *ex ante* information). In this sense, their expectations are rational. This implies that for the alternative that the individual chose, one can reconstruct the *ex ante* expectations from the observed *ex post* outcomes (and other pieces of evidence about the individual's information set). This aspect constitutes a very important advantage of the approach. The main complication associated with this approach is that the expectations regarding the consequences of the alternative(s) that has (have) not been chosen need to be constructed in some other way, since for those alternatives, no *ex post* outcomes are observed.

There is a large number of papers that tackle the two tasks (reconstructing the expectations for the chosen and the not chosen alternatives) under more or less restrictive assumptions. For a method that requires only very weak assumptions to resolve the two tasks, see the paper by [Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro \(2005\)](#).

The alternative approach consists of eliciting expectations directly and using them in the empirical analysis. The main advantage is that expectations data can be obtained both for the chosen and the not-chosen alternatives (i.e., for counterfactual outcome(s)). Moreover, if the goal is to understand what determines the decisions of individuals, this approach does not require any assumption with respect to the questions (a) "Are the expectations (in some sense) rational/correct?" and (b) "How do individuals form expectations?"

Reaping the potentially important advantages of working with expectations data is possible only to the extent to which the elicitation of expectations is feasible. While the literature has reached the consensus that it is possible to obtain meaningful measures of expectations through survey methods (see [Manski \(2004\)](#), [Attanasio \(2009\)](#), and [Delavande, Giné, and McKenzie \(2011\)](#) for surveys of the literature, the latter two on developing countries), it is also clear that there are limits to the amount and complexity of information that can be elicited in a survey.<sup>3</sup>

I make use of data on subjective expectations of returns of a sample of Mexican high school graduates to analyze the importance of information differences in explaining the income gradient in college attendance. Since what matters for the college attendance decision is an individual's perception of her own skills and how these skills (and other characteristics) affect her future earnings, these data ideally provide each individual's earnings expectations conditional on her information set at the time of the decision.

The first finding of this paper is that the expected return to college is an important determinant of the college attendance decision. At the same time, differences in expected returns are not sufficient to explain the differences in attendance rates between poor and rich Mexicans. Instead, data on subjective expectations allow me to show that poor individuals require significantly higher expected returns to be induced to attend college.

I then test predictions of a model of college attendance choice in the presence of credit constraints, using parental income and wealth as proxies for the household's unobserved interest rate. I find that poor individuals are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs such as tuition. This finding is consistent with the poor facing a higher

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<sup>3</sup>I discuss the constraints that are relevant in my context in detail in Section 2.

interest rate. To address the concern that differences in time preferences might be driving the results, I present suggestive evidence that in my sample there are no systematic differences in discount rates between the poor and the rich.

Last, I evaluate potential welfare implications of policies such as governmental fellowship programs by applying the local instrumental variables approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to my model of college attendance (see also Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011)). I find that a sizeable fraction of poor individuals would change their decision and attend in response to a reduction in direct costs. Individuals at the margin have expected returns that are as high or higher than those of individuals already attending college, suggesting that such policies could lead to large welfare gains.

The goal of this paper is to contribute to a growing literature investigating the role of information in schooling decisions and to the literature on credit constraints in higher education decisions. In the context of the first literature, the following three papers analyze the link between “perceived” returns to schooling and people’s schooling decisions.<sup>4</sup>

Jensen (2010) finds that children in 8th grade in the Dominican Republic significantly underestimate returns to schooling. Informing a random subset of them about higher measured returns leads to a significant increase in perceived returns and in attained years of schooling. Nguyen (2008) finds that informing a random subset of children in Madagascar about high returns to schooling increases their attendance rates and their test scores. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) address several complementary issues concerning the link between schooling choice and expectations (using the same data as this paper). In addition to using expected returns—as the first two papers—they also take into account perceived earnings and employment risk. Second, they have data on mothers’ expectations about earnings of their children as well as adolescents’ own expectations and can thus shed light on whose expectations matter for educational choices. Third, they show that schooling decisions are more sensitive to changes in expected returns for rich than for poor students, which is consistent with the existence of credit constraints, as those could break the link between expected returns (or risk perceptions) and schooling decisions. A new version of this paper (Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014)) focuses on the intrahousehold decision process, where data on subjective expectations are used to analyze whose expectations matter and thus who participates in the decision—the parents and/or the youth.<sup>5</sup>

Also, the following papers investigate the role of information in schooling decisions: Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2009) conduct an experiment for low- and moderate-income families in the United States, in which they provide aid eligibility information, while a second treatment combines the information treatment with assistance in the federal application for financial aid. Dinkelman and Martinez (2011) con-

<sup>4</sup>The seminal paper eliciting subjective expectations of earnings for different schooling degrees is by Dominitz and Manski (1996). They illustrate for a small sample of Wisconsin high school and college students that people are willing and able to answer subjective expectations questions in a meaningful way, but do not analyze the link between earnings expectations and investment in schooling.

<sup>5</sup>Three papers that use data on subjective expectations to explain college major choices are Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2013), and Zafar (2009).

duct a field experiment in Chile to investigate whether children in 8th grade from poor backgrounds increase their effort in school upon learning about financial aid options for post-secondary schooling. [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner \(2012\)](#) analyze how college students from low-income families in the United States form expectations about their own academic ability. Their results show that learning about ability plays a very prominent role in the college dropout decision.

In this paper, it would, in principle, have been interesting to ask people not only about expected benefits to college, but also about their knowledge about costs and financial aid possibilities, and about their perceptions about their academic ability. In this context, it is important to stress that at the time of the survey in 2005, financial aid opportunities for post-secondary education were rare in Mexico (see the Supplement). While it would be interesting to have data on students' perceptions about their own ability, I make use of detailed information on past school performance to proxy for students' perceptions about own future performance. Results suggest that although learning about ability appears to be an important determinant for the decision to drop out of school, expectations about returns to schooling are important for enrollment decisions.

This paper is also closely linked to the literature on credit constraints in educational choices. Several papers in the literature investigate the importance of credit constraints in the United States, such as [Cameron and Heckman \(1998, 2001\)](#), [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#), and [Carneiro and Heckman \(2002\)](#), and attribute differences in college attendance rates between poor and rich in the United States to differences in "college readiness." [Cunha \(2007\)](#) finds that credit constraints at the time of deciding about college enrollment are not very important in the United States (compared to college readiness), but that the inability to borrow against future income is important earlier in life, thereby affecting college readiness later on. According to [Navarro \(2011\)](#), ability, preferences, and uncertainty all play important roles. He finds that eliminating borrowing constraints (at the same time as uncertainty), college attendance increases by roughly 8%, and that, in particular, when credit constraints are defined in terms of consumption smoothing, they play a stronger role than previously found.

Most of the existing literature on credit constraints uses earnings realizations to infer expectations about earnings. The important advantage of data on subjective expectations is that (earnings) expectations can be elicited directly for all possible schooling scenarios, that is including counterfactual states. This paper shows how these data can be used in the estimation of a simple school choice model. In a different context, [Mahajan and Tarozzi \(2011\)](#) and [Mahajan, Tarozzi, Yoong, and Blackburn \(2011\)](#) study identification and estimation of key preference parameters in a model of technology adoption when data on subjective expectations about technology's impact are available.

The following papers use alternative approaches for investigating the importance of credit constraints in higher education: [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner \(2008\)](#) analyze college drop-out decisions in the United States. They show that dropout rates would remain high even if credit constraints were removed entirely, that is, when excluding students who state in the survey that they would like to borrow to smooth consumption during studying but cannot. [Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri \(2011\)](#) base their analysis on the assumption that only children of nonaltruistic parents could potentially be

borrowing constrained (while assuming that parents are not constrained). The authors then exploit the fact that the amount of subsidized loans that children can receive increases in the number of siblings who are currently eligible for loans. The authors find that children who are spaced more closely together complete more years of education, but only among the subsample of nonaltruistic parents, thus providing evidence of borrowing constraints for this type of families. A very different methodological approach is taken by [Lochner and Monje-Naranjo \(2011\)](#), who develop a human capital model with borrowing constraints explicitly derived from government student loan programs and private lending under limited commitment. Using the calibrated model, they are able to predict the observed rise in students borrowing from private lenders, as well as the persistent strong positive correlation between ability and schooling, and the rising importance of family income in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. [Lovenheim \(2011\)](#) uses short-run housing wealth changes to identify the effect of housing wealth on college attendance.

This paper aims to contribute to both literatures on credit constraints and on the role of information in educational decisions by analyzing the importance of heterogeneity in expected returns to education and of credit constraints in explaining the income gradient in college attendance in Mexico. The findings of this paper suggest that credit constraints are an important driving force of Mexico's large inequalities in access to higher education and low overall enrollment rates. Mexico's low government funding for college student loans and fellowships (low even compared to other Latin American countries) around the time of my survey (2005) is consistent with this view. The results of my counterfactual policy experiments point to the possibility of large welfare gains from introducing a governmental fellowship program by removing obstacles to human capital accumulation and fostering Mexico's development and growth.

## 2. MODEL OF COLLEGE ATTENDANCE CHOICE

Studies such as [Carneiro and Heckman \(2002\)](#) on the United States have shown that the observed correlation between parental income and children's college attendance is driven by differences in cognitive skills and parental education between the poor and the rich. I do not find this in the Mexican context. In particular, parental income and wealth remain strong predictors of children's likelihood to attend college even after controlling for an extensive list of individual and family background characteristics (including cognitive ability and parental education). Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that this is evidence of credit constraints. Instead, parental income might still capture differences in information sets between poor and rich students that could translate into differences in expected returns and thereby affect the decision to attend college. For example, a student from a poor background might think (and rationally so) that even with a college degree she will not be hired for certain jobs that someone from a richer background with parental "connections" will be hired for (even at the same level of skills). While variables such as "quality of parental network" are usually not included in the information set of the researcher, they might be contained in the individual's information set, affecting her expectations and thereby also her college attendance deci-

sion. Neglecting these factors can lead to wrong conclusions about what is driving college attendance decisions. Data on people's subjective expectations of returns to college allow me to address this concern directly.

I show formally how direct information on people's subjective expectations can be used in a simple model of college attendance. In this model, I abstract from a consumption smoothing motif and simplify the college enrollment problem to one of maximizing the expected present value of earnings given an individual-specific interest (or borrowing) rate. In this context, income differences (and interest rates) matter, because if an individual is rich and expects high returns to college, he/she can pay for the investment (e.g., by foregoing the interest on savings). A poor individual with high expected returns, on the other hand, does not have the resources to cover the direct college costs, while not being able to borrow or to borrow only at an interest rate that is too high to make the investment worthwhile. This model enables me to derive testable implications of credit constraints and to perform counterfactual policy experiments, such as evaluating the welfare implications of a governmental fellowship program.

While a dynamic educational choice model à la [Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago \(2011\)](#), [Todd and Wolpin \(2006\)](#), and others could be interesting and insightful, data limitations—in particular, having data on expected returns to schooling only in the context of a single cross section of data on two cohorts of individuals—do not allow me to estimate a full dynamic model on all educational decisions over the whole schooling history of an individual. In this context, a simple model on college enrollment allows me to illustrate in a straightforward and transparent way how data on subjective expectations can be used to help understand education decisions and to identify the importance of credit constraints. Furthermore, the model I am using allows me to provide evidence on the importance of credit constraints *at the margin of college enrollment*, which is a relevant margin for the following reason: One relatively simple and frequently discussed policy to raise college enrollment among the poor, is to provide fellowships or student loans so as to affect individuals' decisions to enroll in college. This paper's goal is to provide some evidence on whether such a policy could be effective.<sup>6</sup>

I model the college attendance decision of a high school graduate at age 18 as follows (compare [Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil \(2005\)](#)): The high school graduate decides to enroll in college ( $S = 1$ ) if the expected present value of earnings when enrolling in college (conditional on the information she has at age 18,  $EPV_{18}(S = 1)$ ) minus the expected present value of high school earnings (again conditional on the information she has at age 18,  $EPV_{18}(S = 0)$ ) is larger than the costs of attending college (direct costs  $C_i$ , such as tuition, transportation, room and board—if necessary—and monetized psychological costs or benefits):

$$S = 1 \iff S_i^* = EPV_{18}(S = 1) - EPV_{18}(S = 0) - C_i > 0.$$

If the individual decides to enroll in college, she will complete college with probability  $p_i^C$  and receive the expected present value of college earnings,  $EPV_{18}(Y_i^1)$ . If she drops

<sup>6</sup>At the same time, the focus on the decision of college enrollment should not be read as an indication that there are no credit constraints that are relevant for individuals' decisions earlier in their schooling history.

out ( $D$ ), she receives  $EPV_{18}(Y_i^D)$ , which I assume to be equal to the expected present value of high school earnings  $EPV_{18}(Y_i^0)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} S_i^* &= p_i^C EPV_{18}(Y_i^1) + (1 - p_i^C) EPV_{18}(Y_i^0) - EPV_{18}(Y_i^0) - C_i \\ &= p_i^C \sum_{a=22}^A \frac{E_{18}(Y_{ia}^1)}{(1+r_i)^{a-18}} - p_i^C \sum_{a=18}^A \frac{E_{18}(Y_{ia}^0)}{(1+r_i)^{a-18}} - C_i \geq 0, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $i$  denotes the individual,  $a$  is the age of the individual,  $A$  is the age at retirement.  $E_{18}(Y_{ia}^1)$  represents expected earnings with a college degree,  $E_{18}(Y_{ia}^0)$  represents expected high school earnings, and  $r_i$  is the interest rate that individual  $i$  faces. It is important to stress that the expectations should be taken conditional on the information that the individual has at the time of making the decision.

Before discussing in detail the assumptions of this model, I first show formally how data on subjective expectations can be used in such a model of school choice and how this compares to conventional approaches using earnings realizations.

Assume that the economic model generating the data for the two potential outcomes, that is, for earnings with a high school degree ( $j = 0$ ) and for earnings with a college degree ( $j = 1$ ), is of the form (generalized Roy model)

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Y_{ia}^j &= \alpha_j + \beta_j' X_i + \gamma_j E_{ij} + U_{ia}^j \\ &= \alpha_j + \beta_j' X_i + \gamma_j E_{ij} + \theta_j' f_i + \varepsilon_{ia}^j, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

over the whole life cycle,  $a = 18, \dots, A$ . In terms of observable variables,  $a$  labels age,  $A$  labels age at retirement,  $E_{ij}$  labels labor market experience, and  $X_i$  denotes other observable time-invariant variables.

$U^j$  represents the unobservables in the potential outcome equation, which are unobserved from the perspective of the researcher. They are composed of a part that is anticipated by the individual at the time of the college attendance decision,  $\theta_j' f_i$ , and an unanticipated part  $\varepsilon_{ia}^j$ , where  $E(\varepsilon_{ia}^j) = 0$  for  $j = 0, 1$ .  $f_i$  is the individual's skill vector, which captures cognitive and social skills (and any other characteristics of the individual and family that affect future earnings), and  $\theta_j$  is a vector of skill prices, which can vary across individuals. Both  $f_i$  and  $\theta_j$  are in the information set of the individual, while they are—at least in part—unobservable for the researcher.<sup>7</sup> In the conventional approach using earnings realizations,  $\theta_j' f_i$  is unobserved, while  $\theta_j' f_i$  is implicitly “observed” in the approach using data on subjective expectations of earnings. For each individual, I have

<sup>7</sup>Kaufmann and Pistaferri (2009) address the issue of superior information of the individual compared to the researcher in the context of intertemporal consumption choices. They analyze the empirical puzzle of excess smoothness of consumption, that is, the fact that people respond less to permanent shocks than predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. Data on people's subjective expectations of earnings allow them to disentangle two competing explanations, insurance of even very persistent shocks versus superior information of the individual compared to the researcher. They show that people respond less to permanent shocks than predicted because they anticipate part of what the researcher labels as “shocks,” while the role of insurance of very persistent shocks is only minor.

data on her expectations of earnings for age  $a$  for both potential schooling degrees, that is, on the left-hand sides of the equations

$$\begin{aligned} E_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta'_0 X_i + \gamma_0(a - 18) + \theta'_0 f_i, \\ E_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^1) &= \alpha_1 + \beta'_1 X_i + \gamma_1(a - 22) + \theta'_1 f_i, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where the expected labor market experience is the number of years in the labor market,  $a - s^j - 6$  (where  $s^0 = 12$  and  $s^1 = 16$ , since high school implies 12 years of schooling and college implies 16 years). Beliefs about future skill prices,  $\theta_0, \theta_1$ , can be allowed to differ across individuals. Individuals' perceptions about their own skills enter via  $f_i$ .

Thus in my model I can allow for self-selection into schooling on unobservables, which arises from the anticipated part of the earnings,  $\theta'_j f_i$ , while the unanticipated  $\varepsilon^j_{ia}$  can obviously not be acted upon.<sup>8</sup> In the "conventional" generalized Roy model, there is self-selection on  $U_0$  and  $U_1$  (see equation (2)) and no distinction between anticipated and unanticipated idiosyncratic returns. For example, [Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil \(2005\)](#) analyze *ex post* returns in a framework without uncertainty as is common in the literature. I analyze school choice under uncertainty and *ex ante* expected returns. Subjective expectations allow me to take into account the part of the idiosyncratic returns that is anticipated and (potentially) acted upon at the time of the schooling decision.

In this framework, the individual *ex post* (gross) return to college, which can obviously never be observed due to unobserved counterfactual, can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\rho}_{ia} &= \ln Y_{ia}^1 - \ln Y_{ia}^0 \\ &= \alpha + (\beta_1 - \beta_0)' X_i + \gamma_1 E_{i1} - \gamma_0 E_{i0} + (\theta_1 - \theta_0)' f_i + (\varepsilon^1_{ia} - \varepsilon^0_{ia}), \end{aligned}$$

where  $\alpha = (\alpha_1 - \alpha_0)$ .

Using the information given in equation (3), I can derive an expression for the expected (i.e., *ex ante* anticipated) gross return of individual  $i$ , which I can observe for each individual given my subjective expectation data:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_{ia} &= E_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^1 - \ln Y_{ia}^0) \\ &= \alpha + (\beta_1 - \beta_0)' X_i + \gamma_1(a - 22) - \gamma_0(a - 18) + (\theta_1 - \theta_0)' f_i. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

According to my model of college attendance (see equation (1)), one would ideally want data on expected future earnings over the whole life cycle of each individual. Unfortunately, I only have data on expected earnings for age 25 (see Section 3). Thus I need to make an assumption about how earnings (expectations) evolve over the life cycle.

I model the college attendance decision based on the following assumptions.

<sup>8</sup>Compare [Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro \(2005\)](#), who analyze which part of idiosyncratic returns is anticipated. Subjective expectations incorporate this information, as they only include the part that is anticipated. Thus the two approaches could complement each other in learning about individuals' information sets.

**ASSUMPTION 1.** *Log earnings are additively separable in education and years of post-schooling experience. Individuals enter the labor market with zero experience and experience is increasing deterministically until retirement.*

The assumption of log earnings being additively separable in education and experience is commonly used in the literature (compare, e.g., [Mincer \(1974\)](#)). I assume that individuals enter the labor market—either at age  $a = 18$  or at age  $a = 22$ , depending on the college attendance decision—with zero experience and experience is increasing deterministically until retirement. In Section 4, I discuss why the assumption that individuals do not work while studying cannot be driving my results, but would—if anything—lead to an underestimation of the role of credit constraints.

**ASSUMPTION 2.** *Credit constraints are modeled as unobserved heterogeneity in interest rates,  $r_i$ .*

One special case would be two different interest rates, one for the group of credit-constrained individuals,  $r_{CC}$ , and one for the group of individuals who are not constrained,  $r_{NC}$ , with  $r_{CC} > r_{NC}$ . In the literature, heterogeneity of credit access has often been modeled as a person-specific rate of interest (see, e.g., [Becker \(1967\)](#), [Willis and Rosen \(1979\)](#), and [Card \(1995\)](#)). This approach has the unattractive feature that a high lifetime  $r$  implies high returns to savings after labor market entry. The testable prediction that I derive from this model (see Section 4)—that is, excess responsiveness of credit-constrained individuals with respect to changes in direct costs—is robust with respect to this assumption: It can also be derived, for example, from the model of [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#), who use a similar framework, but assume that constrained individuals face higher borrowing rates than unconstrained individuals during school, while both groups face the same (lower) borrowing rate once they graduate.

**ASSUMPTION 3.** *Individuals are risk-neutral.*

In a framework with uncertainty, this assumption implies that the decision problem of college attendance simplifies to maximizing the expected present value of earnings net of direct costs (see [Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil \(2005\)](#)). Of course this is a strong assumption and we might be worried that the poor are more risk-averse than the rich, which could explain part of the income gradient if college is risky. Interestingly, I find that individuals perceive unemployment and earnings risk to be lower with a college degree than with a high school degree (see Table 2), that is, they believe that college insures against labor market risk. In this respect, the poor should be even more likely to enroll in college than the rich if they are more risk-averse. As I will show in Section 4, perceived earnings and unemployment risk are not significant in a regression of college attendance choice (while they are significant in the decision to attend high school (see [Attanasio and Kaufmann \(2009\)](#)), suggesting that the risk measures I use are not simply too noisy). This suggests that risk considerations might not be of first-order importance in this context; for this reason, I do not take them into account in this simple model. On

the other hand, college might be more risky for the poor in other respects, for example, they might be facing a higher risk of dropping out of college.

Since I do not have data on individuals' perceived risk of dropping out of college, I use performance in high school and parental education as proxies for the dropout risk. The idea to use high school performance is based on the findings of [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner \(2012\)](#), who show that academic performance in college is a crucial determinant of college dropout. Since my goal is to explain the college enrollment decision, the preceding academic experience that could determine an individual's perceived dropout risk is given by the performance in high school. The educational background of the parents can be taken as measure of a student's prior for his own ability (which is updated upon observing own performance).

**ASSUMPTION 4.** *Individuals have a common discount factor.*

This assumption is stronger than necessary in this context, but helps to keep the model simple. The assumption needed is that the discount factor is not correlated with people's income/wealth or with the interest rate they face. Thus, in a first step, I exclude, by assumption, the possibility that the income gradient in college attendance is due to systematic differences in time preferences and use data on subjective expectations to disentangle the role of expected returns versus heterogeneity in interest rates in explaining the income gradient. In a second step, I provide empirical evidence in [Section 4.4](#) that there are no systematic differences in time preferences between income groups.

**ASSUMPTION 5.** *The problem is infinite horizon.*

To estimate the model of college attendance choice (see equation (1)), I make use of the data on subjective earnings expectation using the relationship  $E(Y_{ia}) \equiv E(e^{\ln Y_{ia}}) = e^{E(\ln Y_{ia}) + 0.5 \text{Var}(\ln Y_{ia})}$  (which holds with equality in the case of log-normally distributed earnings, which is the traditional parameterization; otherwise it is an approximation). Given the assumptions about returns to experience, I can rewrite the participation equation (1) in terms of expected gross returns to college  $\rho_i$  (see the [Appendix](#) for the derivation),

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_i^* &= f(r_i, \rho_i, C_i, E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0), p_i^C, p_i^{W1}, p_i^{W0}, \sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1), \\
 S_i &= 1 \quad \text{if } S_i^* \geq 0, \\
 S_i &= 0 \quad \text{otherwise,}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{5}$$

where  $S_i$  is a binary variable indicating the treatment status. The decision to attend college depends on the (unobserved) interest rate  $r_i$ , expected return  $\rho_i$ , direct costs of attendance  $C_i$ , opportunity costs  $E(\ln Y_{i25}^0)$ , the probability of completing college  $p_i^C$ , the probability of being employed with college and high school degree,  $p_i^{W1}$  and  $p_i^{W0}$ , and the (subjective) standard deviations of future earnings  $\sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1$ .

Before deriving and testing implications of this model to analyze the role of credit constraints in college attendance decisions, I describe the data that I will be using.

### 3. DATA DESCRIPTION

In this section, I describe the data and discuss in detail the module eliciting subjective expectations of earnings and several validity checks of these data.<sup>9</sup>

#### 3.1 Survey data

The survey “Jovenes con Oportunidades” was conducted in fall 2005 on a sample of about 23,000 15–25-year-old adolescents in urban Mexico (compare [Attanasio and Kaufmann \(2009\)](#)). The sample was collected to evaluate the program Jovenes con Oportunidades, which was introduced in 2002/2003 and which gives cash incentives to individuals to attend high school and to get a high school degree.

Primary sampling units are individuals who are eligible for this program. There are three eligibility criteria: being in the last year of junior high school (9th grade) or attending high school (10–12th grade), being younger than 22 years of age, and being from a family that receives Oportunidades transfers.<sup>10</sup> Due to the last eligibility criteria, the sample only comprises the poorest third of the high school graduate population. Thus even the individuals that I denote as “high” income individuals are not rich.<sup>11</sup> Since I analyze the college attendance decision in this paper, I restrict the sample to high school graduates who decide to either attend college or start to work (or look for work).

The survey consists of a family questionnaire and a questionnaire for each 15–25-year-old adolescent in the household. The data comprise detailed information on demographic characteristics of the young adults, their schooling levels and histories, their junior high school grade point average (GPA), and detailed information on their parental background and the household they live in, such as parental education, earnings and income of each household member, assets of the household, and transfers, including remittances to and from the household. The youth questionnaire contains a section on individuals’ subjective expectations of earnings as discussed in the next section.

The following important remark about the timing of the survey and the college attendance decision is necessary: One might be surprised about the fact that the following analysis, which requires knowledge of earnings expectations as well as of the actual college attendance decision, is possible with just one single cross section. In principle,

<sup>9</sup>Replication files are available in a supplementary file on the journal website, [http://qeconomics.org/supp/259/code\\_and\\_data.zip](http://qeconomics.org/supp/259/code_and_data.zip).

<sup>10</sup>Individuals can be above 18 while in high school, since some individuals start school late or have to repeat grades. Furthermore, the age of the individuals of the sample varies between 15 and 25 because the sample also includes the siblings of the primary sampling units. Last, individuals in grades 9 and 12 (i.e., last grade of junior and senior high school) were oversampled to study their enrollment decisions.

<sup>11</sup>One might wonder whether the participation in the program might have affected expectations in a way that drives my results. Since *all* individuals in my sample have participated in the program, participation is unlikely to lead to *differences* in the behavior of the very poor and the richer individuals. Second, even if earnings expectations were affected in some way, this would only be relevant for the external validity of my results but not for the internal validity, since my analysis conditions on earnings expectations. Of course, the external validity would depend on many other variables as well and not only on Progresas/Oportunidades’ impact on expectations (e.g., on how well developed is the financial sector of a country, other institutional variables, etc.).

I would want to have data on people’s expectations at the time when they are deciding about attending college, that is, some time before college starts in August or September 2005. Instead, the Jovenes survey was conducted in October/November 2005 and thus 2 or 3 months after college had started.

To use this survey for the following analysis, I have to make the assumption that individuals’ information sets have not changed during these 2 or 3 months, or have changed, but left expectations about future earnings at age 25 (i.e., earnings 7 years later) unchanged. As I do not observe expectations of high school graduates *before* college starts, I perform the following consistency check of this assumption: I use the cross section of earnings expectations of a cohort that is one grade below (just starting grade 12 in the survey months October/November) and compare it to the cross section of expectations of my sample of high school graduates. The distributions of expected earnings (for high school and college as highest degree) do not differ significantly between the two cohorts and neither do the distributions of the perceived probability of work, suggesting that expectations have not changed significantly in these 3 months (see Figures 1 and 2; also see the Supplement for results of statistical tests on the equality of the distributions).

These results can also address the following potential concern: individuals might try to rationalize their choice 2 or 3 months later, that is, individuals who decided to attend college rationalize their choice by stating higher expected college earnings (or lower expected high school earnings) and those who decided not to attend state lower expected college and higher high school earnings. This would lead to a more dispersed cross sec-




FIGURE 1. Comparing expectations of high school graduates with a 1-year younger cohort: expected earnings. *Notes:* The difference between the two cross-sectional distributions is not significant in either case (also see the Supplement).




FIGURE 2. Comparing expectations of high school graduates with a 1-year younger cohort: probability of work. *Notes:* The difference between the two cross-sectional distributions is not significant in either case (also see the Supplement).

tion of earnings after the decision.<sup>12</sup> A similar argument applies for the perceived probability of working. I do not find any evidence of ex post rationalization in my data, thus lending support to my assumption.

### 3.2 *The subjective distribution of future earnings*

The subjective expectations module was designed to elicit information on the individual distribution of future earnings and the probability of working for different scenarios of highest completed schooling degree. After showing the respondent a scale from 0 to 100 to explain the concept of probabilities and going over a simple example, the following questions on earnings expectations and employment probabilities were asked.

1. Each high school graduate was asked about the probability of working conditional on two different scenarios of highest schooling degree.

*Assume that you finish high school (college) and that this is your highest schooling degree. From 0 to 100, how certain are you that you will be working at the age of 25?*

2. The questions on subjective expectations of earnings are the following:

<sup>12</sup>This is true unless people switch positions in the distribution in such a way that the resulting cross section looks exactly the same as before. This can only be the case if the people who decide to enroll in college are the ones with particularly *low* expected returns and they later report high returns to college to justify their decision. And similarly, the people who decide not to enroll in college are the ones with particularly high returns and they later state low expected returns.

Assume that you finish high school (college) and that this is your highest schooling degree. Assume that you have a job at age 25.

- (a) What do you think is the maximum amount you can earn per month at that age?
- (b) What do you think is the minimum amount you can earn per month at that age?
- (c) From 0 to 100, what is the probability that your earnings at that age will be at least  $x$ ?

$x$  is the midpoint between maximum and minimum amount elicited from questions (a) and (b), and was calculated by the interviewer and read to the respondent.

In the following paragraph, I briefly describe how the answers to the three survey questions (2(a)–(c)) are used to compute moments of the individual earnings distributions and expected gross returns to college (compare Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri (2002) and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009)). As a first step, I am interested in the individual distribution of future earnings  $f(Y^S)$  for both scenarios of college attendance choice, where  $S = 0$  ( $S = 1$ ) denotes having a high school degree (college degree) as the highest degree. The survey provides information for each individual on the support of the distribution  $[y_{\min}^S, y_{\max}^S]$  and on the probability mass to the right of the midpoint of the support,  $\Pr(Y^S > (y_{\min}^S + y_{\max}^S)/2) = p$ . Thus I need to make a distributional assumption,  $f(\cdot)$ , so as to be able to calculate moments of these individual earnings distributions. I assume a triangular distribution, which is more plausible than a stepwise uniform distribution, as it puts less weight on extreme values.<sup>13</sup>

Thus I can calculate expected earnings  $E(Y^S)$  and perceived earnings risk  $\text{Var}(Y^S)$  for schooling degrees  $S = 0$  and  $S = 1$  for each individual. I will perform the following analysis in terms of log earnings, so that I compute expected log earnings as  $E(\ln(Y^S)) = \int_{y_{\min}^S}^{y_{\max}^S} \ln(y) f_{Y^S}(y) dy$  and I can thus calculate expected (gross) returns to college as

$$\rho \equiv E(\text{return to college}) = E(\ln(Y^1)) - E(\ln(Y^0)).$$

The module on expectations was supposed to be answered by the youths. In cases where the adolescent was not present, mothers answered also the youth questionnaire—including the questions on the subjective distribution of earnings—in addition to the household questionnaire. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) make use of the fact that the data contain information on parents’ expectations for part of the sample and information on youths’ own expectations for the rest of the sample. They analyze whose expectations are relevant for schooling decisions, the ones of the adolescent or the ones of the parents. They find that for the high school attendance decision, only mothers’ expectations are important, while for the college attendance decision, adolescents’ expectations matter.

For this reason, I use the subsample for which the adolescents answer themselves and address the concern of sample selection bias as follows (for summary statistics of

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<sup>13</sup>The first moment of the individual distribution is extremely robust with respect to the underlying distributional assumption (see Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) for more details on the triangular distribution, alternative distributional assumptions, and robustness checks).

the two samples, see the Supplement): I correct for sample selection using a Heckman selection correction (see Heckman (1979)) applied to a nonlinear context, that is, by estimating jointly a latent index model for college attendance and a sample selection equation. As an exclusion restriction, I use information on the exact date and time of the interview, which is a strongly significant determinant of whether the respondent is the adolescent. For example, adolescents are significantly more likely to be at home—and thus able to respond themselves—on weekends and during holidays (see Table 1). Results suggest that sample selection on unobservables is not an important concern, as

TABLE 1. Selection equation: probit model for who responds to the expectation questions.

| Dependent Variable:             | <i>Adolescents Responds</i> |                           |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                 | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE)   | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Interview Sunday                | 0.110*<br>(0.059)           | 0.092<br>(0.061)          |
| Interview Thursday              | -0.087**<br>(0.037)         | -0.089**<br>(0.038)       |
| Interview Thursday * afternoon  | 0.079*<br>(0.042)           | 0.067<br>(0.043)          |
| Interview Saturday * afternoon  | 0.106**<br>(0.052)          | 0.114**<br>(0.053)        |
| Interview Saturday * evening    | 0.285***<br>(0.083)         | 0.336***<br>(0.074)       |
| Interview week 40               | 0.149**<br>(0.060)          | 0.144**<br>(0.061)        |
| Interview week 41               | 0.133***<br>(0.032)         | 0.160***<br>(0.032)       |
| Interview week 42               | 0.112***<br>(0.028)         | 0.117***<br>(0.029)       |
| Interview week 45               | -0.053**<br>(0.026)         | -0.070**<br>(0.027)       |
| Interview week 46               | -0.047<br>(0.037)           | -0.077**<br>(0.038)       |
| Female                          |                             | 0.102***<br>(0.018)       |
| GPA, top tercile                |                             | -0.089***<br>(0.021)      |
| Father's educ., jr. high school |                             | -0.036<br>(0.029)         |
| Father's educ., sr. high school |                             | -0.005<br>(0.056)         |

(Continues)

TABLE 1. *Continued.*

| Dependent Variable:        | <i>Adolescents Responds</i> |                           |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
|                            | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE)   | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Father's educ., univ.      |                             | -0.154<br>(0.102)         |
| Mother's educ., univ.      |                             | 0.285**<br>(0.143)        |
| Per cap. income 5-10k      |                             | -0.012<br>(0.022)         |
| Per cap. income > 10k      |                             | 0.017<br>(0.025)          |
| Distance to univ. 20-40 km |                             | 0.022<br>(0.022)          |
| Distance to univ. > 40 km  |                             | -0.016<br>(0.026)         |
| Tuition > 750 pesos        |                             | -0.011<br>(0.030)         |
| State fixed effects (FE)   | Yes                         | Yes                       |
| Observations               | 3342                        | 3342                      |
| Log likelihood             | -2264.413                   | -2172.746                 |
| <i>p</i> -value            | 0.000                       | 0.000                     |

*Notes:* This table displays marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Excluded categories are interview on Monday, interview in the morning, interview in week 43 (weeks 40-42 are holidays), male, lowest GPA tercile, parents' education primary or less, per capita income less than 5000 pesos. GPA second tercile, and mother's education lower than university are insignificant and not displayed due to space constraints.

I find that the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is never significantly different from zero once I control for individual and family background characteristics (see Section 4.3). Also, the results are similar and lead to the same conclusions when using the full sample, that is, including the adolescents for whom the mother answers using mothers' expectations (results from the author upon request).

### 3.3 *Validity checks of the data on expected earnings and returns to college*

In this section, I compare the data on subjective expectations of future earnings to data on actual earnings and provide evidence of their value added (for summary statistics of the variables used in the following analysis, see Table 2).

It is important to stress that the possibility that individuals might be misinformed or might have convictions that are distorted/biased is not an argument *against* the use of expectations data, but instead is one of the main arguments *in their favor*. It is exactly the observation that individuals make different experiences and that they are exposed

TABLE 2. Summary statistics.

| Variable                          | Obs. | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Median |
|-----------------------------------|------|----------|-----------|--------|
| Expected return                   | 1612 | 0.6670   | 0.3820    | 0.6047 |
| Expected log high school earnings | 1612 | 7.5778   | 0.5004    | 7.6432 |
| Var. of log high school earnings  | 1612 | 0.0054   | 0.0079    | 0.0028 |
| Var. of log college earnings      | 1612 | 0.0039   | 0.0061    | 0.0019 |
| Prob. of work, high school        | 1612 | 0.6657   | 0.1817    | 0.7    |
| Prob. of work, college            | 1612 | 0.8250   | 0.1601    | 0.9    |
| College attendance rate           | 1612 | 0.2308   | 0.4215    | 0      |
| Female                            | 1612 | 0.5813   | 0.4935    | 1      |
| GPA (scale 0–100)                 | 1612 | 82.19    | 7.16      | 82     |
| GPA, second tercile               | 1612 | 0.2804   | 0.4493    | 0      |
| GPA, top tercile                  | 1612 | 0.2773   | 0.4478    | 0      |
| Father's years of schooling       | 951  | 5.33     | 2.96      | 6      |
| Father's educ., jr. high school   | 1612 | 0.1067   | 0.3088    | 0      |
| sr. high school                   | 1612 | 0.0292   | 0.1683    | 0      |
| college                           | 1612 | 0.0050   | 0.0703    | 0      |
| Mother's years of schooling       | 1140 | 5.03     | 2.77      | 5      |
| Mother's educ., jr. high school   | 1612 | 0.1234   | 0.3291    | 0      |
| sr. high school                   | 1612 | 0.0174   | 0.1307    | 0      |
| college                           | 1612 | 0.0037   | 0.0609    | 0      |
| Per cap. par. income (pesos)      | 1187 | 7519.54  | 8010.08   | 5200   |
| Per cap. par. income < 5000 pesos | 1612 | 0.5906   | 0.4692    | 1      |
| 5000–10,000 pesos                 | 1612 | 0.2407   | 0.4276    | 0      |
| > 10,000 pesos                    | 1612 | 0.1687   | 0.3746    | 0      |
| Distance to univ. (km)            | 1612 | 24.2312  | 22.8159   | 18.26  |
| Distance to univ. < 20 km         | 1612 | 0.5298   | 0.4993    | 1      |
| 20–40 km                          | 1612 | 0.2599   | 0.4387    | 0      |
| > 40 km                           | 1612 | 0.2103   | 0.4076    | 0      |
| Tuition costs (pesos)             | 1171 | 608.8104 | 634.5729  | 750    |
| Tuition costs > 750 pesos         | 1612 | 0.4187   | 0.4935    | 0      |

to different pieces of information that has led economists to the conclusion that it is unlikely that they all hold the same belief. But if the beliefs of two individuals can differ substantially, then it immediately follows that it is important to control for these differences in beliefs if we want to correctly understand the differences in the observed behavior of these two individuals.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, it is important to be able to obtain a (at least noisy) measure of the beliefs that people base their decision on. For that reason, the goal of this section is to convince the reader that the high school graduates in my

<sup>14</sup>Even if poor individuals' earnings expectations were downward biased, this would still not invalidate my results or conclusions since they are obtained through a comparison of poor and rich individuals who hold the *same* earnings expectations. Suppose that poor students are indeed more likely to underestimate their true potential than rich students. Then my findings tell us that *on top of this latter problem (downward biased income expectations)*, poor students also face credit constraints: they are less likely to attend college than the rich even when they hold the same expectations.

sample were able to understand the questions on expectations and to give meaningful answers.

First, I compare the level of earnings expectations of Mexican high school graduates to the level of contemporaneous earnings realizations using Census data of the year 2000. In particular, I compare observed high school earnings to expected high school earnings for those individuals who decided to stop school after high school. I thereby take into account that realized high school earnings are only observable for this subgroup of people (analogously for college earnings). This exercise is informative, but not a test of whether people have “correct” expectations, because the expectations are about future earnings that are only realized in the year 2012. Expected monthly high school earnings are 1940 pesos (and thus approximately \$200(U.S.) compared to mean observed high school earnings of 1880 pesos. Expected college earnings are larger than college earnings observed in the year 2000 (3800 versus 3300 pesos). These results are consistent with people expecting a continuation of previous trends, that is, stagnating high school earnings and increasing college earnings. The implied returns—defined as the difference between log college earnings and log high school earnings—are thus around 0.65 and very similar to other studies on Mexico (see, e.g., [Binelli \(2008\)](#), who finds a difference of 0.64 in log hourly wages between higher and intermediate education in 2002 using data from the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH), and compare [Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil \(2005\)](#), who find a log difference of 0.4 for the United States).<sup>15</sup>

While the Mexican high school graduates in my sample appear to have a decent knowledge about skill prices (at least on average), there is a large amount of heterogeneity in expected earnings. Part of this heterogeneity can be explained by individual and family characteristics. Interestingly, earnings expectations vary with individual and family background characteristics in a similar way as do observed earnings in Mincer earnings regressions. For example, female youths expect significantly lower earnings, while the gender gap is smaller for college than for high school earnings (as observed in the case of realized earnings), and expected college earnings are positively correlated with the GPA of the youth (see the Supplement).<sup>16</sup>

Still a considerable amount of heterogeneity in expected earnings remains, which could reflect measurement error in subjective expectations or could be due to superior information of the individual compared to the researcher, for example, about her own cognitive and noncognitive skills, about how well her parents are connected and will help her find a job, and so forth (compare [Kaufmann and Pistaferri \(2009\)](#) for evidence

<sup>15</sup>Studies differ in their findings about how well informed their subjects are. For example, [Jensen \(2010\)](#) finds that children in grade 8 in the Dominican Republic significantly underestimate returns to schooling, while I find that the earnings expectations of Mexican high school graduates are, on average, relatively close to observed earnings. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the surveyed youths in this paper have completed at least 11 years of schooling and are thus more likely to understand the probabilistic questions well than are individuals with lower education levels, as in many other studies in developing countries.

<sup>16</sup>Also I test for behavioral biases and provide evidence that those who decide to attend college do not exert more mental effort in responding to the questions than those who decide not to go to college (results from the author upon request). As I have shown in Section 3.1, there is no evidence that people justify their schooling decisions *ex post*.

on superior information of people in the labor force about future income, which helps in explaining the puzzle of excess smoothness of consumption). The following result suggests that at least part of the heterogeneity in subjective expectations can be explained by heterogeneity in people's information sets: People's expectations remain an important determinant of schooling decisions even after controlling for an extensive set of individual and family background characteristics, which reflect the information set of the researcher in conventional approaches (see Section 4).

The results of this section suggest that the data on subjective expectations are a (at least noisy) measure of the beliefs that people base their decisions on, and thereby help to bridge the usual differences in information sets between the researcher and the individuals who are studied. This points toward an important value added of data on subjective expectations for our understanding of people's schooling decisions.

### 3.4 *Data on educational costs*

According to the model of college attendance choice (see Section 2), direct costs of attending college should be an important determinant of college attendance decisions in addition to expected earnings. In Mexico these costs pocket a large fraction of parental income for relatively poor families, as will be shown below. Thus they might play an important role in explaining low college attendance rates of the poor.

I collected data on the two most important cost factors—enrollment and tuition costs and costs of living. As costs of living during college depend heavily on the accessibility of universities, I use distance to college as a proxy (compare, e.g., Card (1995) and Cameron and Taber (2004), who use a dummy for whether there is a college in the same country). In my sample, the majority of people who decide to go to college are indeed enrolled in the college closest to them (85% go to the college in their own municipality, 95% in their own state). Thus distance appears like a good measure of direct costs in my context.

For example, if an adolescent lives far away from the closest university, she will have to move to a different city and pay room and board. She thus has to incur important additional costs compared to someone who can live with her family during college. I collected information on the location of higher education institutions offering 4-year undergraduate degrees and computed the actual distance between these institutions and the adolescents' locality of residence.<sup>17</sup> About half of the adolescents live within a distance of 20 kilometers to the closest university, which might permit a daily commute with public transportation. One quarter live within 20–40 kilometers distance, while the other quarter live more than 40 kilometers away (see summary statistics in Table 2).

In terms of (yearly) tuition and enrollment fees, I use administrative data from the National Association of Universities and Institutes of Higher Education (ANUIES). I determine the locality with universities that is closest to the adolescents' locality of res-

<sup>17</sup>I use information on the location of public and private universities and technical institutes offering undergraduate degrees from the Department of Public Education (SEP, Secretaria de Educacion Publica-Subsecretaria Educacion Superior). I extracted geocode information of all adolescents' localities of residence (around 1300) and of all localities with at least one university—in the states of my sample and in all neighboring states—from a web page provided by INEGI (National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information). My special thanks to Shaun McRae, who helped extract these data.

idence and use the lowest tuition fee of all the universities in this locality as my cost measure. The median tuition fee is 750 pesos (see Table 2).<sup>18</sup> This is equivalent to 15% of median per capita parental income in my sample, while it only represents a fraction of total college attendance costs. Thus college attendance would imply a substantial financial burden for poor families.

To analyze whether the ability to finance college costs plays a major role in explaining the income gradient in college attendance, I need proxies for unobserved financing costs (reflected by the interest rate in my model; see Section 2). Financing costs depend mainly on parental income and wealth, which determine the availability of resources, the ability to collateralize and receive loans, and the interest rate at which to receive loans or forego savings.

The survey provides detailed information on income of each household member, savings if it exists, durable goods, and remittances. I create the following two measures: per capita parental income and an index of parental income and wealth.<sup>19</sup> Median yearly per capita income is 5200 pesos (approximately \$520). I use these two measures, per capita parental income and an index of parental income and wealth, as proxies for the (unobserved) interest rate that the household faces when testing implications of borrowing constraints in my model of educational choices.

I use per capita parental income as a measure of the resources available to the youth, since in the standard framework, siblings compete for limited resources within the household, so that an increase in the number of children decreases average child investment (see, e.g., [Becker and Lewis \(1973\)](#)). On the other hand, in particular in developing countries, it is not uncommon that older siblings contribute to household resources that are used to invest in the education of their younger siblings. Therefore, I show that using measures of total family income (and wealth) leads to very similar results (see the Supplement).

As the relationship between income/wealth and the interest rate that families face might not be linear, I use dummies for different categories of per capita parental income with the following income thresholds: twice and four times the minimum monthly salary (equivalent to around 5000 and 10,000 pesos). These thresholds correspond to official thresholds that determine eligibility for government programs, such as fellowship programs, where families with per capita income below twice the minimum wage are classified as most in need and given priority, while families are still eligible with income up to four times the minimum wage. Again it is important to point out that fellowships and student loans played a very limited role for higher education in Mexico around the time of my survey: only 5% of the undergraduate student population received a fellowship in 2004, while about 2% benefited from a student loan (for further details on the

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<sup>18</sup>Unfortunately, the measure of tuition costs is missing for nearly a third of the sample. I include these missing observations in the excluded category of the dummy of tuition costs to avoid small sample sizes.

<sup>19</sup>Per capita parental income includes parents' labor earnings, other income sources such as rent, profits from a business, and pension income, and remittances, divided by family size. The index of parental income and wealth is created by a Principle component analysis of per capita income, value of durable goods, and savings. Only a very selective and richer group of households saves or borrows: 4% of households have savings, while 5% borrow.

system of higher education in Mexico, see the Supplement). With this classification, 59% of the sample fall into this first category of income below 5000 pesos and 24% have per capita income between 5000 and 10,000 pesos, as shown in Table 2. For robustness, I also use an index of parental income and wealth as a second proxy for the interest rate that a family faces, and include this measure using quartiles, since the index does not have a natural unit of measurement.

#### 4. WHAT EXPLAINS THE INCOME GRADIENT IN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT?

In this section, I analyze what explains the large differences in college enrollment rates between poor and rich Mexicans. In particular, I am interested in distinguishing between the following two explanations: Data on individuals' expectations allow me to analyze whether differences in expected (monetary) returns (or perceived risks) between the poor and the rich explain the gap in college enrollment. In that case, I need to investigate further whether poor Mexicans rationally expect lower returns than the rich (e.g., due to lower quality primary and secondary education, the family being less well "connected," etc.) or whether they *underestimate* their potential returns to college education or *overestimate* risks (e.g., they are not informed about certain career opportunities with a college degree).

If, on the other hand, the poor expect similar returns as the rich, but require higher expected returns to be induced to attend, then they have to be facing higher direct costs of schooling (where costs are defined broadly as including, for example, tuition costs and psychological costs or benefits from college) or higher borrowing costs. To understand the role of different cost components, it is important to model the decision to enroll in college dependent on all those potential determinants.

##### 4.1 *The income gradient and expected returns*

The first exercise is to analyze whether parental income is correlated with college attendance, *only* because it picks up differences in how much individuals can benefit from going to college. To address this issue, conventional approaches control for "long-run factors" such as parental education and individual ability to proxy for these benefits. I then add controls for individuals' expectations about their potential returns to college (and their perceptions about unemployment and earnings risk) to control in a more direct way for monetary returns to college and to allow for differences in information sets between the poor and the rich.

Table 3 shows that individuals' expected returns are an important predictor for the decision to enroll in college, even after controlling for an extensive set of individual and family background characteristics. The perceived probabilities of working and perceived earnings risk, on the other hand, are not significant (while [Attanasio and Kaufmann \(2014\)](#) find that these measures are relevant for the decision to enroll in senior high school). As higher ability youths expect higher returns to college, the coefficient on the expected return to college becomes slightly smaller after controlling for youths' GPA and parents' education. In as far as higher ability affects college attendance via higher

TABLE 3. Probit model of the college attendance decision.

| Dependent Variable:                   | <i>College Attendance</i> |                           |                           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (3)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Expected return to college            | 0.092***<br>(0.033)       | 0.078**<br>(0.034)        | 0.077**<br>(0.034)        |
| Prob. of work, sr. high school        | 0.032<br>(0.087)          | 0.013<br>(0.085)          | 0.005<br>(0.081)          |
| Prob. of work, college                | -0.008<br>(0.101)         | -0.001<br>(0.099)         | 0.032<br>(0.092)          |
| Var. of log earnings, sr. high school | -2.625<br>(1.919)         | -3.016<br>(2.008)         | -2.959<br>(1.958)         |
| Var. of log earnings, college         | -0.310<br>(2.351)         | 0.036<br>(2.291)          | 0.196<br>(2.164)          |
| Female                                | -0.055*<br>(0.029)        | -0.059*<br>(0.033)        | -0.046<br>(0.032)         |
| GPA, second tercile                   |                           | 0.055*<br>(0.031)         | 0.055*<br>(0.031)         |
| GPA, top tercile                      |                           | 0.187***<br>(0.038)       | 0.174***<br>(0.045)       |
| Father's educ., jr. high school       |                           | 0.099**<br>(0.042)        | 0.073*<br>(0.042)         |
| Father's educ., sr. high school       |                           | 0.151*<br>(0.078)         | 0.100<br>(0.075)          |
| Father's educ., univ.                 |                           | 0.547***<br>(0.120)       | 0.574***<br>(0.131)       |
| Mother's educ., jr. high school       |                           | 0.100**<br>(0.040)        | 0.074*<br>(0.039)         |
| Mother's educ., sr. high school       |                           | 0.203**<br>(0.099)        | 0.173*<br>(0.101)         |
| Per cap. income 5-10k                 |                           |                           | 0.051*<br>(0.031)         |
| Per cap. income ≥ 10k                 |                           |                           | 0.119***<br>(0.037)       |
| Distance to univ. 20-40 km            |                           |                           | -0.076***<br>(0.029)      |
| Distance to univ. ≥ 40 km             |                           |                           | -0.106***<br>(0.031)      |
| Tuition ≥ 750 pesos                   |                           |                           | -0.082**<br>(0.039)       |
| State FE                              | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                       |

(Continues)

TABLE 3. *Continued.*

| Dependent Variable:              | <i>College Attendance</i> |                           |                           |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                  | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (3)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Observations                     | 3342                      | 3342                      | 3342                      |
| Uncensored observation           | 1612                      | 1612                      | 1612                      |
| Log likelihood                   | -3041.971                 | -2990.349                 | -2972.964                 |
| Sample sel.: corr. between error | -0.487                    | -0.282                    | -0.131                    |
| Sample sel.: <i>p</i> -value     | 0.055                     | 0.314                     | 0.654                     |

*Notes:* This table displays marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Excluded categories are male, lowest GPA tercile, father's and mother's education primary or less (mother's education university not displayed, as not significant due to small number of observations), per capita income less than 5000 pesos, distance to university less than 20 km, and tuition less than 750 pesos.

expected returns, one should not control for ability separately. The reasons for controlling for GPA and parental education are to control for the perceived probability that the youth will complete college and, second, to control for differences in tastes for education (psychological costs/benefits).

The main conclusion of Table 3 is that enrollment gaps between the poor and the rich remain even after controlling not only for conventional long-run factors such as ability and parental education, but also for the return to college that the individual expects (and thus for potential information differences between income groups).

Before I give some back-of-the-envelope calculations to quantify the potential importance of credit constraints, I first discuss three important reasons why it is entirely possible that I underestimate their role. The first and most important reason is related to the sample on which my analysis is based. In particular, my sample comprises roughly the poorest third of the Mexican population, since all households are recipients of *Progres*a/*Oportunidades*. Thus also among the "richest" income group in my sample (i.e., the somewhat less poor), there might be individuals who are credit constrained. As my analysis is based on a comparison of the enrollment rates between income groups, it can only give an idea of how many *more* individuals are constrained among the poor compared to the somewhat less poor.

The second and third reasons why my analysis leads to a lower bound on the role of credit constraints are related to the meaning of the elicited expectations.

In Mexico, like in other countries, universities vary in their quality and, consequently, also in their tuition fees. Unfortunately, I do not know which quality people had in mind when answering the expectation questions. If individuals already take into account budget constraints when stating their expectations, then the poor and the richer might state expectations related to different types of colleges. The poor may report lower expected returns than an equally smart richer individual, because the latter has in mind a more expensive higher quality college. Even though the poor individual is constrained since she does not consider the more expensive high quality university, in my analysis that individual would be considered "not constrained," that is, low expected returns would explain the low enrollment rate of these individuals.

The third reason is related to the fact that students might consider working while studying. Working while studying would imply *ceteris paribus* that the individual either takes longer to complete his studies (and thus receives college earnings 1 year later), which he would be unlikely to do unless credit constrained, or the individual would have less time to study per course and, therefore, perform less well, in which case he is likely to graduate with worse grades and should, therefore, expect lower earnings.<sup>20</sup> This implies that an individual who anticipates that he has to work to fund himself will expect lower college earnings (because of worse grades and/or studying longer, which sends a bad signal) and this would explain his low likelihood of college attendance, that is, I would classify this individual as not credit constrained, while he should be classified as constrained. On the other hand, the individual might state expectations for the ideal case of going to college without having to work, but then does not go to college since he cannot borrow, in which case I would correctly classify him as constrained.

Keeping in mind these three observations, I give a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the importance of credit constraints. I follow the analysis of Carneiro and Heckman (2002), who regress the college attendance decision on ability (i.e. the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)) and other long-run factors, and use the coefficients on parental income quartiles to estimate what fraction is credit constrained. In particular, Carneiro and Heckman compute a (weighted) average of the gaps in enrollment between highest and lower income quartiles. Of course, in this exercise, the fraction that is defined as credit constrained crucially depends on the enrollment rates of the highest income group, since enrollment gaps are determined by a comparison with the latter. Therefore, my estimate can only give an idea of how many *more* individuals are constrained among the poorer compared to the slightly less poor.

When conducting this exercise based on the coefficients of the parental income categories in column 3 of Table 3, I find that, in my sample, among the poorer income groups, 8% more individuals are credit constrained than among the highest (or least poor) income group.<sup>21</sup> To put this figure into perspective, the enrollment of the “highest” income group in my sample is about 33%. When taking into account the full Mexican population, people in the highest income quartile display college enrollment rates of 67% (see the Supplement).

#### 4.2 Differences in expected returns between poor and rich

Having shown in the previous section that family resources still matter for the likelihood to enroll in college—even after controlling for expected returns—and that an important fraction of individuals might be credit constrained in their college attendance choice,

<sup>20</sup>One might argue that working while studying leads individuals to enter the labor market with job experience, which could be rewarded in terms of higher earnings. At the same time, individuals who have to work to support themselves while studying usually work in lower quality jobs, such as working at McDonalds, where the job experience is unlikely to be rewarded in terms of higher college earnings.

<sup>21</sup>This figure is based on the difference between lowest and highest income group, which is 11.9%, where the low-income group makes up 59% of my sample, and on the difference between the middle- and highest-income group, which is 5.1% with a weight of 24%.

I show in this section that poor individuals require significantly higher expected (monetary) returns than the rich to be induced to attend college. Data on people's subjective earnings expectations allow me to conduct this exercise without any further assumptions, since I have information on the expected return of every individual, while otherwise returns are unobservable at the individual level.

I estimate the probability of college enrollment conditional on expected returns  $\Pr(S = 1|\rho = \tilde{\rho})$  by performing Fan's (1992) locally weighted linear regression of college attendance  $S$  on the expected return  $\rho$ .<sup>22</sup> I perform this analysis for different income categories, that is, for low-, middle-, and high-income individuals (yearly per capita income less than 5000 pesos, between 5000 and 10,000 pesos, and more than 10,000 pesos, where the thresholds correspond to twice and four times the minimum wage; see Section 3.4). I calculate point-wise confidence intervals applying a bootstrap procedure.

Figure 3 shows that poor individuals require significantly higher expected returns to be induced to attend college than do the rich, as the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of costs is shifted to the right for poorer individuals. Among individuals with expected returns of around  $\rho = 0.6$  (which is equal to the median gross return defined as the difference between expected log college and high school earnings; see Section 3.3), 45% of rich individuals attend, but only 25% of the poor. Poor individuals thus require higher expected returns to be induced to attend college. These differences are significant (see the Supplement). In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the individuals I call rich in my sample are still relatively poor (below the median income in society), as my sample only comprises families that are Oportunidades beneficiaries. Thus we would expect even larger differences when comparing the poor to truly rich individuals.




FIGURE 3. The cumulative distribution function of costs for different income classes.

<sup>22</sup>I use a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.3. A smaller bandwidth will lead to a more wiggly line, while the result of a significant right shift in the c.d.f. of costs for poorer individuals remains unchanged. Note that the c.d.f. of costs can only be estimated over the support of the expected return.

### 4.3 Testable implications of a model with credit constraints and empirical results

I have shown that differences in expected returns alone cannot explain the income gradient in college enrollment in Mexico. Instead, poorer individuals require higher expected returns to be induced to attend college, which implies that they have to be facing higher costs of college attendance (where costs are broadly defined as including direct costs, such as tuition and psychological costs/benefits, and borrowing costs). For this reason, I make use of the model of college attendance choice introduced in Section 2, which allows for a potential role of credit constraints, while being able to take into account people's expectations about returns and controlling for differences in direct costs. As discussed, credit constraints are captured by heterogeneity in the interest rate that people face.

To understand whether credit constraints play an important role in driving low enrollment rates of poor Mexicans, I derive the following testable implications of credit constraints from my model of college attendance choice. The model implies that individuals who face a high interest rate  $r$  react more strongly to changes in direct costs  $C$  (see equation (18) in the [Appendix](#)):

$$\left| \frac{\partial P(S=1)}{\partial C} \right| \text{ is increasing in } r. \quad (6)$$

Intuitively, an increase in costs has to be financed through a loan (or foregone savings) with interest rate  $r$ . The negative impact of a cost increase is thus larger for people who face a large interest rate.

I test this prediction using dummies for groups that are likely to face different interest rates if credit constraints are important, that is, I use dummies of parental income (and wealth). Thus I test for excess responsiveness of poor individuals with respect to changes in direct costs, such as tuition costs and distance to college.

The prediction of excess responsiveness of credit-constrained groups to changes in direct costs is not specific to my model. This prediction can be derived from a more general class of school choice models, such as, for example, from the model of [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#). They have more general assumptions concerning heterogeneity in interest rate (see Section 2), that is, they allow for  $r$  to be different between credit-constrained and -unconstrained individuals during school while  $r$  is the same for both groups after school. [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#), [Card \(1995\)](#), and [Kling \(2001\)](#) use a similar test, interacting variables such as parental income and race with a dummy for the presence of a college in the residential county.<sup>23</sup>

Compared to conventional approaches, data on subjective expectations provide the following two advantages: First, I can control directly for people's expectations about their potential returns to college and thereby avoid biased estimates that could arise

<sup>23</sup>[Card \(1995\)](#) and [Kling \(2001\)](#) find evidence of important credit constraints for an older cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS Young Men), while [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#) do not find evidence of credit constraints for the United States using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979. This is consistent with increased availability of fellowships and loans in the United States over the relevant time period.

from omitting this determinant. This makes my test more robust and enables me to analyze the validity of the test used without controlling for people's expectations. Second, being poor does not necessarily imply being credit constrained: only poor individuals with high expected returns are potentially prevented from attending college due to high financing costs, as they are the ones likely to be close to the margin of indifference ( $S^* = 0$ ). Poor low-return individuals, on the other hand, would not attend college anyway. Thus with information on expected returns, I can refine the test and test for excess responsiveness of poor *high-expected-return* individuals to changes in direct costs.

The first cost measure that I use is distance of the adolescent's home to the closest university (see Section 3.4). As shown in the previous section, living farther away from the closest university has a significantly negative effect on the probability of attending college. Table 4 illustrates that the negative effect of a larger distance is particularly strong for poor individuals as predicted by the model in the presence of credit constraints. Living 20–40 kilometers away from college instead of less than 20 kilometers decreases the probability of attending by about 9 percentage points for the poorest income category and this negative effect is significantly larger for the poor than for the rich ( $p$ -value 0.07). Increasing the distance to more than 40 kilometers has a large effect for the middle-income category, but the coefficients for the different income categories are not significantly different from each other. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that credit constraints are identified by comparing the poorest individuals to the richer individuals in my sample, who are themselves relatively poor. This could explain why, in the case of a high cost shock, all income groups are similarly responsive.<sup>24</sup>

The conclusions remain unchanged when I use different proxies for being credit constrained, that is, quartiles of an indicator of parental income and wealth and measures of total family income/wealth (see the Supplement).

In terms of the second cost measure, I use yearly tuition and enrollment fees. In particular, I use a dummy for tuition costs above 750 pesos (the median), which is equivalent to 15% of median yearly per capita income and thus represents an important financial burden for poor individuals. The first two columns of Table 5 would suggest that tuition costs do not have an effect on attendance, that is, the coefficient for the poor is negative and for the rich is positive, but neither of the coefficients is significant. At the same time, the difference between the coefficients of poor and rich is significant, that is, they are differentially responsive to a cost increase. Once I take into account that what matters is being poor *and* having high expected returns, results become even more pronounced: Poor individuals with high expected returns, defined as returns above the median, are excessively responsive with respect to a change in tuition costs. An increase in tuition to more than 750 pesos reduced the likelihood of attending by 12 percentage points for poor high-return individuals. The negative effect of an increase in costs is significantly larger for the poor than for the rich ( $p$ -value 0.09). The same picture arises using quartiles of the parental income and wealth indicator or when using total fam-

<sup>24</sup>A comparison between the first and second columns of Table 4 shows that including measures of expectations does not change the results (with the exception that the coefficients on the dummies for distance become slightly more negative for poor and middle-income families).

TABLE 4. Excess responsiveness of the poor to changes in direct costs (distance to college).

| Dependent Variable:                                 | College Attendance        |                           |                           |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|   | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (3)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income < 5k                   | -0.089**<br>(0.044)       | -0.092**<br>(0.044)       | -0.076<br>(0.059)         |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income < 5k * high exp. ret.  |                           |                           | -0.067<br>(0.083)         |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income 5–10k                  | -0.044<br>(0.054)         | -0.049<br>(0.054)         | -0.041<br>(0.078)         |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income 5–10k * high exp. ret. |                           |                           | -0.022<br>(0.109)         |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income > 10k                  | 0.053<br>(0.071)          | 0.048<br>(0.070)          | 0.062<br>(0.099)          |
| Univ. 20–40 km * par. income > 10k * high exp. ret. |                           |                           | -0.026<br>(0.119)         |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income < 5k                    | -0.048<br>(0.043)         | -0.051<br>(0.043)         | -0.041<br>(0.058)         |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income < 5k * high exp. ret.   |                           |                           | -0.064<br>(0.081)         |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income 5–10k                   | -0.136***<br>(0.051)      | -0.145***<br>(0.050)      | -0.160**<br>(0.069)       |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income 5–10k * high exp. ret.  |                           |                           | 0.046<br>(0.152)          |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income > 10k                   | -0.045<br>(0.071)         | -0.047<br>(0.072)         | -0.152**<br>(0.075)       |
| Univ. > 40 km * par. income > 10k * high exp. ret.  |                           |                           | 0.292<br>(0.200)          |
| Par. income < 5k * high exp. ret.                   |                           |                           | 0.088<br>(0.059)          |
| Par. income 5–10k * high exp. ret.                  |                           |                           | 0.184**<br>(0.084)        |
| Par. income > 10k * high exp. ret.                  |                           |                           | 0.132<br>(0.093)          |
| Controls for expected return, exp. log earning      |                           |                           |                           |
| Prob. of work and var. of log earning               | No                        | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Controls: GPA, par. income and educ., sex, state FE | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Observations  | 3342                      | 3342                      | 3342                      |
| Uncensored observation                              | 1612                      | 1612                      | 1612                      |
| Log likelihood                                      | -2984.591                 | -2971.787                 | -2965.898                 |
| Sample sel.: corr. between error                    | -0.167                    | -0.172                    | -0.112                    |
| Sample sel.: <i>p</i> -value                        | 0.569                     | 0.556                     | 0.709                     |

Notes: This table displays marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Excluded categories are male, lowest GPA tercile, parents' education primary or less, per capita income less than 5000 pesos, interactions of distance to university of less than 20 km with parental income, and low expected return interacted with parental (per capita) income.

TABLE 5. Excess responsiveness of the poor to changes in direct costs (tuition costs).

| Dependent Variable:                                 | <i>College Attendance</i> |                           |                           |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
|   | (1)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (2)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) | (3)<br>Marg. Eff.<br>(SE) |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income < 5k                    | -0.043<br>(0.040)         | -0.052<br>(0.040)         | -0.010<br>(0.058)         |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income < 5k * high exp. ret.   |                           |                           | -0.124*<br>(0.064)        |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income 5–10k                   | -0.013<br>(0.055)         | -0.021<br>(0.055)         | -0.053<br>(0.075)         |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income 5–10k * high exp. ret.  |                           |                           | 0.039<br>(0.108)          |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income > 10k                   | 0.073<br>(0.069)          | 0.069<br>(0.070)          | 0.042<br>(0.102)          |
| Tuition > 750 * par. income > 10k * high exp. ret.  |                           |                           | 0.021<br>(0.127)          |
| Par. income < 5k * high exp. ret.                   |                           |                           | 0.099<br>(0.062)          |
| Par. income 5–10k * high exp. ret.                  |                           |                           | 0.149*<br>(0.086)         |
| Par. income > 10k * high exp. ret.                  |                           |                           | 0.131<br>(0.093)          |
| Controls for expected return, exp. log earnings     |                           |                           |                           |
| Prob. of work and var. of log earnings              | No                        | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Controls: GPA, par. income and educ., sex, state FE | Yes                       | Yes                       | Yes                       |
| Observations  | 3342                      | 3342                      | 3342                      |
| Uncensored observation                              | 1612                      | 1612                      | 1612                      |
| Log likelihood                                      | -2987.347                 | -2975.075                 | -2969.499                 |
| Sample sel.: corr. between errors                   | -0.268                    | -0.305                    | -0.280                    |
| Sample sel.: <i>p</i> -value                        | 0.358                     | 0.297                     | 0.310                     |

Notes: This table displays marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Excluded categories are male, lowest GPA tercile, parents' education primary or less, per capita income less than 5000 pesos, interactions of tuition costs less than 750 pesos with parental income, and low expected return interacted with parental (per capita) income.

ily income/wealth (see the Supplement). For individuals in the lowest income/wealth quartile with high expected returns, an increase in tuition costs reduces their likelihood of attending by about 15 percentage points (significantly larger in absolute value than for the top quartile, with a  $p$ -value of 0.08).

While I found that an increase in costs in terms of distance has the largest effect on the poor (as predicted by my model), I also want to investigate whether the negative effect of an increase in distance to college is larger for poor *high-return* individuals. The results point in a similar direction but are less clear-cut when including the triple interaction (which slices the already small sample even further): Using income to proxy for the interest rate, the negative effect of an increase in distance is larger for high-return

poor than for the average poor (the coefficient doubles), but the difference is not significant (see Table 4). Results are similar for parental income and wealth or total family income/wealth (see the Supplement).

To sum up, results of this section are consistent with the predictions of a model with credit constraints. At the same time one might still be worried that the results might be driven by the poor having a higher discount rate than the rich. I will investigate this issue in the next section.

#### 4.4 *Differences in time preferences between poor and rich*

The goal of this section is to address the concern that results are driven by the poor having a higher discount rate than the rich (instead of facing a higher interest rate). For this purpose, I make use of survey questions on health-related variables associated with making trade-offs between the present and future. In particular, I use questions on smoking and drinking alcohol. The literature on time preferences suggests that there is an important correlation between time preferences and health-related variables. For example, a study by Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, and Taubinsky (2008) finds that the discount rate is significantly correlated with health-related variables such as body-mass index, exercise, and smoking, and that it can explain 15–20% of the variation (across people) in each of these measures, while no other variable explains as much of the variation as the discount rate. For other studies that rely on smoking as proxies for time preferences, see the survey article by Grossman (2000) (also see Khwaja, Silverman, and Sloan (2007)).

To provide suggestive evidence on whether differences in time preferences between the poor and the rich might be driving my results, I make use of the following survey questions on smoking and drinking alcohol: “Do you currently smoke?”<sup>25</sup> “Do you drink (even if occasionally)?”, and “On average, how many beers, coolers, viña real, glasses of wine, brandy, mezcal, and so forth do you drink in a normal week?” (the last question was asked to those who answered “Yes” to the previous question). In addition, I use a question on how the youths would make use of 3000 pesos (around \$300), if they had this amount available in that moment, that is, whether they would use it for immediate consumption or to save/invest (e.g., in education).

In Table 6, I compare the answers to the three survey questions on health-related variables and to the survey question on the usage of 3000 pesos for youths of different income groups. I find that 3% of the individuals smoke, irrespective of the income category they belong to. In terms of drinking alcohol, 12% of the poorest and the middle-income group state “Yes” versus 17% of the richer income group (the difference between the poor and the rich is significant on 5%), that is, rich youths are more likely to drink. To exclude those who occasionally have a drink, I also create a dummy for whether an individual has more than two drinks per week (in a normal week) and find that 4% of the poor and the rich have, on average, more than two drinks per week, compared to 3% of

<sup>25</sup>Of those who currently smoke, 94% had started smoking before age 18.

TABLE 6. Time preference of different per capita income categories.

|   | <i>Per Capita Income Category</i> |                |                |                    |                    |
|---|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|   | ≤ 5000                            | 5000–10,000    | ≥ 10,000       | Comparison         |                    |
|   | (1)                               | (2)            | (3)            | (1)–(2)            | (1)–(3)            |
|   | Mean                              | Mean           | Mean           | Diff.              | Diff.              |
|   | (SD)                              | (SD)           | (SD)           | ( <i>p</i> -Value) | ( <i>p</i> -Value) |
| <i>Intertemp. Behavior: Health</i>                  |                                   |                |                |                    |                    |
| Smoke   | 0.03<br>(0.17)                    | 0.03<br>(0.18) | 0.03<br>(0.16) | –0.00<br>(0.693)   | 0.00<br>(0.749)    |
| Drink alcohol                                       |                                   |                |                |                    |                    |
| Yes   | 0.12<br>(0.32)                    | 0.12<br>(0.32) | 0.17<br>(0.37) | 0.00<br>(0.889)    | –0.05<br>(0.043)   |
| ≥ 2/week  | 0.04<br>(0.20)                    | 0.03<br>(0.18) | 0.04<br>(0.19) | 0.01<br>(0.420)    | 0.00<br>(0.647)    |
| <i>How Use 3000 Pesos?</i>                          |                                   |                |                |                    |                    |
| Immediate consumption<br>(alternative: save/invest) | 0.17<br>(0.38)                    | 0.19<br>(0.40) | 0.22<br>(0.41) | –0.02<br>(0.362)   | –0.05<br>(0.093)   |
| Observations  | 952                               | 388            | 272            |                    |                    |

*Notes:* Columns 1–3 display means and standard deviations in brackets. Columns 4 and 5 display the difference between columns 1 and 2, and columns 1 and 3, respectively, and the *p*-value of the difference in brackets.

the middle-income category (differences are not significant). Answering the question, “If you had 3000 pesos now, what would you do with the money?”, 17% of the poor state that they would use the money for immediate consumption instead of saving/investing the money. Among the middle-income group, 19% would use the money for immediate consumption; among the rich, 22% would use the money for consumption. The differences between the poor and the rich are significant on 10%. These findings are hard to reconcile, with the poor being more impatient than the rich.<sup>26</sup>

To sum up, the results in this section suggest that the poor are not more impatient than richer individuals in my sample. Thus differences in discount rates between poor and rich do not seem to explain the income gradient.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup>The income groups used are equivalent to the ones I have used in the previous analysis, and the thresholds correspond to two and four times the minimum monthly salary (see Section 3.4). If, instead of comparing income categories, I compare different income/wealth quartiles, I again find very similar results, none of which suggests that the poor are more impatient than the rich. Also, if I regress the variables smoking, drinking any alcohol, having more than two drinks, and using 3000 pesos for consumption on measures of parental income/wealth while controlling for individual characteristics such as age, gender, and state of residence, I do not find any significant correlation (see the Supplement).

<sup>27</sup>Including the variables smoking, drinking, and money usage in my regressions analysis, I find that both smoking and drinking have a (large) negative coefficient but are not significant (smoking is close to significant in some specifications). A dummy for using the money for immediate consumption has a strong and significant negative effect on the decision to enroll in college. Including those variables in my analysis does not change the qualitative results; quantitatively, the results become stronger (results available from the author upon request).

## 5. COUNTERFACTUAL POLICY EXPERIMENTS

In the previous section, I have shown that poor people require significantly higher returns to be induced to enroll in college. Furthermore, I have shown that poor (high-expected-return) individuals are most sensitive to changes in direct costs, which is consistent with credit constraints affecting college attendance decisions of poor Mexicans with high expected returns. I have provided suggestive evidence that these results are not driven by differences in time preferences between the poor and the rich in my sample. Thus my results point toward the importance of credit constraints in college attendance decisions of poor Mexicans.

For this reason, I evaluate potential welfare implications of the introduction of a fellowship program that can be means-tested or performance-based. I perform counterfactual policy experiments by applying the local instrumental variables methodology of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to my model of college attendance, making use of data on subjective expectations of earnings. I estimate the fraction of people changing their decisions in response to a reduction in direct costs and derive the expected returns of those individuals (“marginal” expected returns).

The comparison between marginal expected returns (of individuals who switch participation in response to a policy) and average expected returns of individuals attending college is interesting not only from a policy-evaluation point of view. If marginal expected returns are higher than expected returns of individuals who attend college, then individuals at the margin have to be facing particularly high unobserved costs, as they would otherwise also be attending college given their high expected returns.

One word of caution is necessary before describing the counterfactual policy experiments. As argued in this paper, data on people’s subjective expectations can be very useful for understanding people’s behavior, as the data appear to capture the beliefs that people base their decisions on (compare Section 3.3). For the welfare analysis, on the other hand, one would like to know people’s actual returns, which are never observed. Given that people seem to have a good understanding of their potential earnings (see Section 3.3) and most likely have a better knowledge of their own skills, people’s expectations might be relatively realistic. Nevertheless, it is very hard to evaluate the rationality of expectations. Thus the policy experiments should be taken with caution in terms of quantitative evaluation of the welfare benefits and should be seen more as an additional piece of evidence concerning the importance of borrowing constraints, as explained below.

The idea of the third test of credit constraints comparing marginal returns to returns of those attending school is directly linked to Card’s interpretation of the finding that in many studies, instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the return to schooling exceed ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (see Card (2001)). Since IVs can be interpreted as estimating the return for individuals induced to change their schooling status by the selected instrument, finding higher returns for “switchers” suggests that these individuals face higher marginal costs of schooling. In other words, Card’s interpretation is that “marginal returns to education among the low-education subgroups typically affected by supply-side innovations tend to be relatively high, reflecting their high marginal costs of schooling, rather than low ability that limits their return to education.”

This argument has two problems in terms of how the idea was implemented (compare Carneiro and Heckman (2002)) and another more fundamental problem in terms of assumptions about people's information sets. I will argue how these problems can be addressed using data on subjective expectations. In terms of the implementation, the validity of many of the instruments used in this literature has been questioned, thus challenging the IV results.<sup>28</sup> Second, even granting the validity of the instruments, the IV–OLS evidence is consistent with models of self-selection or comparative advantage in the labor market even in the absence of credit constraints. The problem is that OLS does not necessarily estimate the average return of those individuals who attend college,  $E(\beta|S = 1) \equiv E(\ln Y_1 - \ln Y_0|S = 1)$ , which would be the correct comparison group to test for credit constraints. Rather, OLS identifies  $E(\ln Y_1|S = 1) - E(\ln Y_0|S = 0)$ , which could be larger or smaller than  $E(\beta|S = 1)$ .<sup>29</sup>

Data on subjective expectations allow me to directly test the validity of the “instrument” that I will be using to compute marginal returns and perform policy experiments: In contrast to the situation with earnings realizations, subjective expectations are asked for both possible states of highest potential schooling degree, which implies that I also have data on “counterfactual earnings.” Therefore, I can compute expected returns for each individual and test whether returns are orthogonal to distance to college, which is the instrument that I will be using. With data on each individual's expected return, I can also directly address the second problem of implementation: I can directly compute the average (expected) return of the adolescents who attend college and I do not have to rely on OLS. Therefore, I can compare marginal returns with returns of the individuals who chose to attend in the spirit of Card's interpretation of the IV–OLS comparison.

Even if this test could be implemented with data on earnings realizations alone, the following fundamental problem concerning people's information sets would remain: People at the margin might have—ex post—higher returns than those who attend. But these people might have decided not to attend because they expected low returns *ex ante*. As argued before, data on people's subjective expectations permit one to relax the rational expectations assumption with strong requirements on coinciding information sets of individuals and the researcher.

I can test the validity of the instrument used here by regressing expected returns on polynomials of distance to college and tuition costs in the first column (in addition to observable characteristics of the individual and her family background) and on the dummies I use for distance and tuition costs, and I find that neither the coefficients on distance to college nor on tuition costs are significantly different from zero (adding further polynomials does not change the results) (see the Supplement).

<sup>28</sup>Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show for several commonly used instruments using the NLSY that they are either correlated with observed ability measures, such as AFQT, or uncorrelated with schooling.

<sup>29</sup> $E(\ln Y_1|S = 1) - E(\ln Y_0|S = 0) = E(\beta|S = 1) + (E(\ln Y_0|S = 1) - E(\ln Y_0|S = 0))$ , where the last bracket could be larger or smaller than zero. In particular, in the case of comparative advantage, the OLS estimate will be smaller than the average return of those attending. This could lead to a case in which IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates, but smaller than the average return of those attending, from which one would wrongly conclude that credit constraints are important.

### 5.1 Implications of credit constraints for marginal returns to college

From the latent index model (see equation (5)), I can derive the return at which an individual is exactly indifferent between attending college or not, in which case  $S^* = 0$ .

An individual is indifferent between attending college or not at the implicitly defined marginal return,  $\rho^M$ :

$$S_i^* = f(r_i, \rho_i^M, C_i, E(\ln Y_{i25}^0), p_i^C, p_i^{W1}, p_i^{W0}, \sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1) = 0. \quad (7)$$

The presence of credit constraints has the implication for marginal returns that implicit differentiation of equation (7) leads to

$$\frac{d\rho_i^M}{dr_i} = -\frac{\partial f / \partial r_i}{\partial f / \partial \rho_i^M} > 0$$

and thus credit constrained individuals, who face higher borrowing costs,  $r_{CC} > r_{NC}$ , have higher marginal returns than those individuals on the margin who are not credit constrained:

$$\rho^M(r_{CC}) > \rho^M(r_{NC}).$$

### 5.2 Derivation of the marginal return to college

To provide further evidence on the importance of credit constraints (by comparing expected returns of people at the margin of attending—marginal returns to college—to the return of those already attending) and to introduce a framework to perform counterfactual policy experiments, I show how the local instrumental variable (LIV) methodology of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) can be applied to my model of college attendance and data on subjective expectations of earnings (see also Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010)).<sup>30</sup>

First, I show how I can derive a selection equation from my school choice model (see Section 2), which is characterized by heterogeneity in the unobserved interest rate  $r$ . The propensity score can then be estimated from this selection equation. Second, I show how the predicted value of the propensity score is used in the estimation of the marginal returns to college (or marginal treatment effect, MTE).

The LIV methodology relies critically on the assumption that the selection equation has a representation in additively separable form,  $S^* = \mu(Z) - U_S$  (see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Vytlacil, and Urzua (2006)). In general, this is not the case in a school choice model with credit constraints. In my case, data on subjective expectations allow me to write the selection equation in additively separable form despite unobserved heterogeneity in interest rates, as I will show below. The key assumption is that all unobserved heterogeneity stems from the interest rate, while parental education, youths' ability, distance to college, and tuition costs are sufficient to control for direct costs.

<sup>30</sup>In the Supplement, I give a brief introduction to the derivation of the marginal treatment effect (MTE) and of the policy-relevant treatment effect (PRTE).

Under this assumption, the selection equation as derived from my model can be expressed as a fourth-order polynomial in the unobservable interest rate,  $1 + r$  (see the [Appendix](#) for the derivation),

$$S_i^* \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow (1 + r_i)^4 - A(Z_i; \theta)(1 + r_i)^3 - B(Z_i; \theta) \leq 0, \tag{8}$$

where  $A(Z_i; \theta), B(Z_i; \theta) > 0$  are functions of  $Z_i = (\rho_i, C_i, E(\ln Y^0), p_i^{W1}, p_i^{W0}, p_i^C, \sigma_i^0, \sigma_i^1)$ , including the expected return  $\rho_i$  from the data on subjective expectations, and a coefficient vector  $\theta$ . One can show that this fourth-order polynomial equation has exactly one positive root with  $1 + r_i \geq 0$ , which can be analytically computed, so that the following relationship holds:<sup>31</sup>

$$g(Z_i; \theta) \geq 1 + r_i \Rightarrow (1 + r_i)^4 - A(Z_i; \theta)(1 + r_i)^3 - B(Z_i; \theta) \leq 0.$$

The selection equation can thus be rewritten in the additively separable form (defining  $V_i$  as deviations from the mean interest rate  $r_i = \bar{r} + V_i$ )

$$\begin{aligned} S_i^* &= -(1 + \bar{r}) + g(Z_i; \theta) - V_i, \\ S_i &= 1 \quad \text{if } S_i^* \geq 0, \\ S_i &= 0 \quad \text{otherwise.} \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

I estimate the propensity score  $P(Z)$  using a maximum likelihood procedure. I can then define the values  $u_S$  over which the marginal return to college (MTE) can be identified with the help of the predicted values of the propensity score: The MTE is defined for values of  $\widehat{P}(z)$ , for which one obtains positive frequencies for both subsamples  $S = 0$  and  $S = 1$  (i.e., observations outside of the support are dropped).

As a second step in the derivation of the marginal return to college, one can show that the MTE can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(u_S) &\equiv E(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0 | U_S = p) \\ &= \frac{\partial \left\{ \int_0^P E(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0 | U_S = p) dU_S \right\}}{\partial p} \Bigg|_{p=u_S} = \frac{\partial m(p)}{\partial p} \Bigg|_{p=u_S}, \end{aligned}$$

where the integral in the numerator can be rewritten as (see the [Appendix](#))

$$\begin{aligned} m(p) &\equiv \int_0^P E(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0 | U_S = p) dU_S = pE(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0 | U_S \leq p) \\ &= pE(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0 | P(Z) = p, S = 1). \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

<sup>31</sup>The intuition is as follows: We are interested in whether the function  $f(x) = x^4 - ax^3 - b$  has exactly one root on the positive real line (which is the relevant range for the interest rate), that is, for  $x \geq 0$ . For values of  $x$  smaller than or equal to  $a$ , the function is negative, as  $f(x) = x^3(x - a) - b < 0$  if  $x \leq a$ . For values of  $x$  larger than  $a$ , the function is always increasing ( $f'(a) = a^3$  and  $f'(x) = 4x^3 - 3ax^2 > 0$  for  $x \geq a$ ) and the slope is bounded below by  $a^3$  ( $f''(x) = 6x(2x - a) > 0$  for  $x \geq a$ ), so there is exactly one positive root.

With subjective expectations of earnings, one has data on each individual's expectation of earnings in both schooling states ( $E(\ln Y_{it}^1 - \ln Y_{it}^0)$ ). In addition, I can use the predicted value of the propensity score,  $\widehat{P}(z) = p$ , for each individual, which I calculated in the first step after estimating  $P(Z)$ , and I have data on the actual school choice  $S$ . Thus I can compute  $m(p)$ .

Finally I estimate the  $\Delta^{\text{MTE}}(u_S) = \frac{\partial m(p)}{\partial p}$  for different values of  $p = u_S$  by fitting a non-parametric regression of  $m(p)$  on the propensity score using a locally weighted regression approach (Fan (1992)). The predicted value of this regression at  $p$  is then the estimated value of the regression function at the grid point, that is,  $\hat{m}(p) = \hat{\beta}_0(p) + \hat{\beta}_1(p)p$ .  $\hat{\beta}_1(p)$  is a natural estimator of the slope of the regression function at  $p$  and thus estimates the MTE for different values of  $p = u_S$ . I calculate standard errors by applying a bootstrap over the whole procedure described in this section (including estimation and prediction of  $P(Z)$ ).

In a third step, I make use of the estimated MTE to conduct policy experiments—such as evaluating the introduction of fellowships—by estimating the policy-relevant treatment effect (again I calculate standard errors of the PRTE by applying a bootstrap around the procedure described above, including the computation of the PRTE).

### 5.3 Estimation of the marginal return to college

This section describes the estimation of the marginal return to college and discusses the empirical results of this estimation, while the next section discusses the results of the policy experiments.

First, I estimate the propensity score from a reduced-form version of the participation equation (9) using a maximum likelihood procedure (compare Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011)). To empirically implement the notion of costs,  $C$ , I use the following auxiliary regression containing dummies for the distance to the closest university, for tuition costs above 750 pesos, and for state fixed effects to capture differences in direct costs. To proxy for preferences (i.e., psychological costs or benefits from college) and for the probability of completing college, I include parents' education and past school performance (GPA of junior high school). The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the propensity score are displayed in Tables 4 and 5, and are discussed in Section 4.3.

Second, I determine the relevant support for the MTE by estimating the density of the predicted probability of attending college. I compare the density for high school graduates who decided to attend college ( $S = 1$ ) with that of those who stopped school after high school ( $S = 0$ ) using smoothed sample histograms. The probability of attending college is generally relatively low for adolescents of the Jovenes sample, but there is a right shift in the density for high school graduates who decided to attend college. Their mean (median) probability is about 34% (32%), while the mean (median) probability of attending for those who stopped is around 26% (24%) (also see the Supplement). Since there is little mass outside of the interval  $[0.08, 0.67]$ , I estimate the marginal return to college over the support of  $p \in [0.08, 0.67]$ .

Third, I estimate the MTE. I estimate a series of locally weighted regressions on each point on the grid of  $u_S = P(Z)$  using a step size of 0.01 over the support of  $P(Z)$ . The

estimators of the slope of these regressions for the different points on the grid are the marginal returns for different levels of unobservables  $u_s = P(Z)$ .<sup>32</sup>

Last, I calculate standard errors by performing a bootstrap over the whole procedure discussed above. Unfortunately, error bands are wide, particularly for large values of  $P(Z)$  for which there are few data points (in the Supplement, I display the marginal return to college with 95% confidence intervals using a bandwidth of 0.15).<sup>33</sup> In the next section, I will use these estimation results to perform policy experiments.

#### 5.4 Results of the policy experiments

The goal of this section is twofold: First, I evaluate potential welfare implications of government policies, such as the introduction of a governmental fellowship program or tuition subsidies. Therefore, I analyze the effect of a change in direct costs on the likelihood to attend college. To simulate the effect of a means-tested and a merit-based policy, I perform this analysis separately for poor and for poor and able individuals. Means-tested policies should help to target the policy to those individuals most likely to be constrained, since resources are limited. Eligibility based on merit—determined, for example, in terms of previous school performance—has the advantage that the policy supports individuals who are more likely to actually complete college instead of dropping out.

In this analysis, I compute the fraction of people changing their decisions as a result of the policy and derive the average marginal expected returns of these individuals. I estimate the policy-relevant treatment effect (PRTE) for the policies of interest, which will be a weighted average of the marginal returns to college (MTE), as determined in the previous section. For the evaluation of policies, it is crucial to derive the marginal return instead of the average return of a randomly selected individual, because only the people “at the margin” are the ones who will respond to policies.

Second, I compare the average marginal expected return to the average expected return of individuals attending college. Thus with subjective expectations, I can improve on the test suggested by Card (2001). Larger marginal returns indicate that individuals at the margin face higher unobserved costs.

The first policy I evaluate is a decrease in the distance to the closest university. This could be seen as a literal decrease in the distance by building new universities in places that previously did not have higher education institutions or as a reduction in direct costs via fellowships for costs of living. Of course the implied costs of the two policies are likely to be very different and difficult to determine. In addition, the analysis in this section does not take into account general equilibrium effects of such policies. Thus the goal of this section is not a complete cost–benefit analysis, but to test for credit constraints by comparing expected returns of people at the margin to the ones of those al-

<sup>32</sup>In the Supplement, I displays the marginal return to college for three different bandwidths using a Gaussian kernel. One can see that the choice of bandwidth controls the trade-off between bias and variance: while a relatively small bandwidth of 0.1 leads to a wiggly line that is clearly undersmoothed, a large bandwidth of 0.2 seems to lead to an oversmoothed graph.

<sup>33</sup>Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil (2011) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil (2010) have the same problem of wide confidence bands using the NLSY. The fact that my sample only contains relatively poor individuals all of whom have a low probability of attending college is likely to aggravate the problem.

ready attending and to give an idea of potential welfare benefits of government policies such as fellowship programs in Mexico.

In Section 4.3, I have shown that a change in distance to college affects poor high-return individuals most. In addition, I take into account in this section that a change in costs can only affect individuals at the margin. I perform the analysis by decreasing the distance to college by 20 kilometers (for different target groups). This counterfactual policy leads to an increase in college attendance of about 4% (1 percentage point) and to an average marginal expected return of 0.89 (see Table 7).<sup>34</sup> Decreasing the distance only for very poor individuals (per capita income less than 5000 pesos) leads to a change in attendance of 2%, while those individuals who change college attendance have an average marginal expected return of 0.88. For very poor and very able individuals (per capita income less than 5000 pesos and GPA in the top tercile), this policy would lead to a change in attendance of about 1% and an average marginal expected return of 0.90.

We cannot reject that the average marginal return (between 0.88 and 0.90 for the three groups) is as high or higher than the average expected return of those already attending college (0.71). In the case of the last group (very poor and high performing), their expected return is even close to being significantly larger than the average expected return of those attending college ( $p$ -value 0.14).

TABLE 7. Counterfactual policy experiments.

| <i>Policy Change:</i>             | Individuals Changing<br>College Attendance Decision                   |   | Individuals<br>Attending College           |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
|                                   | Change in Overall<br>Attendance Rate<br>in pp (in %)<br>( $p$ -Value) | <i>Marginal</i><br>Expected Return<br>(MTE) | <i>Average</i><br>Expected Return<br>(TTE) | <i>Diff.</i><br><i>MTE – TTE</i><br>( $p$ -Value) |
| <i>Decrease Distance by 20 km</i> |   |   |  |   |
| For all                           | 1 pp (4%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.02)                                       | 0.89  | 0.71                                       | 0.18<br>(0.16)                                    |
| For very poor                     | 0.4 pp (2%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.07)                                     | 0.88  | 0.71                                       | 0.17<br>(0.26)                                    |
| For very poor and very able       | 0.2 pp (1%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.07)                                     | 0.90  | 0.71                                       | 0.19<br>(0.14)                                    |
| <i>Decrease Tuition by 10%</i>    |   |   |  |   |
| For all                           | 0.4 pp (2%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.39)                                     | 0.83  | 0.71                                       | 0.12<br>(0.29)                                    |
| For very poor                     | 0.3 pp (1.5%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.28)                                   | 0.79  | 0.71                                       | 0.08<br>(0.37)                                    |
| For very poor and very able       | 0.3 pp (1.5%)<br>( $p$ -value 0.28)                                   | 0.81  | 0.71                                       | 0.10<br>(0.36)                                    |

<sup>34</sup>The (expected) return is defined as the log difference between expected college and high school earnings. As discussed in Section 3.3, the average expected return is close to estimates of realized returns in Mexico.

As a second policy experiment, I consider the effect of a 10% decrease in tuition costs, for example, via tuition subsidies. A 10% reduction in tuition costs leads to an average marginal return of 0.83, 0.79 for the poor, and 0.81 for the poor and able, which is as high as the average expected return of those individuals attending (see Table 7). Unfortunately, tuition costs are very noisily measured, so standard errors for the fraction of “switchers” and for the marginal returns are large.

To conclude, these results imply that individuals at the margin have to be facing high unobserved costs to explain the fact that they did not attend college in the absence of the policy, despite having expected returns as high or higher than of those (rich) individuals already attending college.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper has been to improve our understanding of the huge differences in college enrollment rates between poor and rich individuals in Mexico and to show how data on people’s subjective expectations of earnings can help in this endeavor.

When examining reasons for low school attendance among the poor, researchers face the following identification problem: On the one hand, poor people might expect particularly low returns to schooling—due, for example, to lower cognitive skills or perceptions of limited career opportunities even with a college degree—and thus decide not to attend. On the other hand, they might face high attendance costs that prevent them from attending despite high expected returns.

To address this identification problem, I use data on people’s subjective expectations of their idiosyncratic returns to college. Since what matters for people’s decisions is the perception of their own cognitive and social skills and their beliefs about future skill prices, these data ideally provide people’s expectations conditional on their information sets.

Using data on subjective expectations, I can show that poor individuals require significantly higher expected returns to be induced to attend college than individuals with wealthy parents. I found that poor individuals are particularly responsive to changes in direct costs, which is consistent with the predictions of a model with credit constraints. Furthermore, I have provided suggestive evidence that there are no systematic differences in time preferences between people of different income categories, so that my results are unlikely to be driven by the poor being more impatient than the rich.

Evaluating potential welfare implications by applying the local instrumental variables approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to my model, I found that a sizeable fraction of poor individuals would change their decision and attend in response to a reduction in direct costs. Individuals at the margin have expected returns that are as high or higher than the ones of individuals already attending college, which is consistent with credit constraints playing an important role.

My results suggest that credit constraints are one of the driving forces of Mexico’s large inequalities in access to higher education and low overall enrollment rates, and point to large welfare gains of introducing a governmental fellowship program by removing obstacles to human capital accumulation and fostering Mexico’s development and growth.

APPENDIX

*Derivation of the participation equation*

The goal of this section is to use the potential outcome equations (2) and the subjective expectation information (3) in my model of college attendance according to which an individual decides to attend college if

$$EPV_{18}(Y_i^1) - EPV_{18}(Y_i^0) - \frac{C_i}{p_i^C} \geq 0. \tag{11}$$

To express the expected present value (EPV) of earnings for both schooling scenarios in terms of subjective expectations of earnings, I need to take into account that the questions on subjective expectations of earnings were asked conditional on working ( $E_{18}(Y_{ia}^S | W^S = 1)$  for  $S = 0, 1$ ) in addition to asking about the perceived probability of working in the two different schooling scenarios ( $p_i^{WS}$  for  $S = 0, 1$ ).<sup>35</sup>

$$EPV_{18}(Y_i^1) = \sum_{a=22}^A \frac{p_i^{W1} E_{18}(Y_{ia}^1 | W^1 = 1)}{(1 + r_i)^{a-18}}. \tag{12}$$

To then use the potential outcome equations (2) and the subjective expectation information (3), and rewrite the participation equation in terms of expected returns to college, I use the relationship

$$E(Y_{ia}) \equiv E(e^{\ln Y_{ia}}) = e^{E(\ln Y_{ia}) + 0.5 \text{Var}(\ln Y_{ia})}, \tag{13}$$

which holds exactly in the case of earnings that are distributed log normally, which is the traditional parameterization, (otherwise approximately).

Thus I can rewrite the expected present value of college earnings (analogously for high school earnings) as

$$\begin{aligned} EPV_{18}(Y_i^1) &= \sum_{a=22}^{\infty} \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^1 | W^1 = 1) + 0.5 \text{Var}_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^1 | W^1 = 1))}{(1 + r_i)^{a-18}} \\ &= \sum_{a=22}^{\infty} \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(\alpha_1 + \beta'_1 X_i + \gamma_1(a - 22) + \theta'_1 f_i + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2)}{(1 + r_i)^{a-18}} \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

<sup>35</sup>I can also allow the increase in experience to differ across people depending on their perceived probability of being employed with a high school and a college degree ( $p_i^{W0}$  and  $p_i^{W1}$ ), which should capture the fraction of the year that they expect to be employed (in principle, one would like to use the perceived probability of working for each year over the whole life cycle, but in my data, questions on subjective expectations were only asked for age 25, so that I would have to assume  $p_{ia}^{Wj} = p_{i25}^{Wj} = p_i^{Wj}$  for all  $a$  and for  $j = 0, 1$ ). In that case,  $E_{18}(\ln Y_{ia}^0) = \alpha_0 + \beta'_0 X_i + \gamma_0 p_{ia}^{W0}(a - 18) + \theta'_0 f_i$  and analogously for college earnings. The following derivation goes through with the adjustment that  $\gamma_S$  would have to be substituted by  $\gamma_S p_i^{WS}$  for  $S = 0, 1$  in all following equations (results from the author upon request).

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(\alpha_1 + \beta'_1 X_i + \theta'_1 f_i + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2)}{(1 + r_i)^4} \cdot \left( \sum_{a=22}^{\infty} \frac{\exp(\gamma_1(a - 22))}{(1 + r_i)^{a-22}} \right) \\
 &= \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(\alpha_1 + \beta'_1 X_i + \theta'_1 f_i + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2)}{(1 + r_i)^4} \left( \frac{1 + r_i}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)} \right),
 \end{aligned}$$

where I assume that  $\exp(\gamma_j) < 1 + r_i$  for  $j = 0, 1$  to apply the rule for a geometric series,<sup>36</sup> that  $\text{Var}(\ln Y_{ia}^S | W^1 = 1) = (\sigma_i^S)^2$  for all  $a$ , and  $S = 0, 1$  and that  $A \rightarrow \infty$  as an approximation.

Data on subjective expectations of earnings for age  $a = 25$  thus allow me to rewrite the expected present value of college earnings as (see equation (3))

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{EPV}_{18}(Y_i^1) &= \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^1 | W^1 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2 - 3\gamma_1)}{(1 + r_i)^3} \\
 &\quad \cdot \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)} \right).
 \end{aligned}$$

Analogously, I can derive the expression for  $\text{EPV}_{18}(Y_i^0)$ :

$$\text{EPV}_{18}(Y_i^0) = p_i^{W0} \exp(\alpha_0 + \beta'_0 X_i + \theta'_0 f_i + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2) \cdot \left( \frac{1 + r_i}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_0)} \right). \quad (15)$$

Substituting the expressions for the expected present value of college and high school earnings into equation (11), an individual decides to attend college if

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\left[ \frac{p_i^{W1} \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^1 | W^1 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2 - 3\gamma_1)}{(1 + r_i)^3} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)} \right) \right] \\
 &\quad - \left[ p_i^{W0} \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2 - 7\gamma_0) \cdot \left( \frac{1 + r_i}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_0)} \right) \right] \\
 &\quad - \frac{C_i}{p_i^C} \\
 &\geq 0,
 \end{aligned}$$

which I can rewrite in the form

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^1 | W^1 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2) - \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2) \\
 &\quad \cdot \left[ (1 + r_i)^4 \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(3\gamma_1)}{\exp(7\gamma_0)} \left( \frac{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)}{1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_0)} \right) \right] \\
 &\geq (1 + r_i)^3 \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1}} (1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)).
 \end{aligned}$$

<sup>36</sup>Some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that this assumption is reasonable in the given context: Papers such as Connolly and Gottschalk (2006) and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) find returns to experience well below 0.05 for the United States, while interest rates in Mexico are clearly significantly higher than 0.05 in the relevant period (see, for example, McKenzie (2006)).

In the following discussion, I assume:  $(\frac{1+r_i-\exp(\gamma_1)}{1+r_i-\exp(\gamma_0)}) \approx 1$ , which is approximately satisfied given estimates of returns to experience of around 0.03 for college and 0.02 for high school and an interest rate of around 10% (see, for example, as mentioned above, [Connolly and Gottschalk \(2006\)](#) using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the United States, or [Heckman, Lochner, and Taber \(1998\)](#), who show that differences in returns to experience between high school and college educated are small).

To express the decision rule in terms of expected gross returns to college and use the information on expected returns from subjective expectations of earnings (see expression (4)), I use a Taylor series approximation of  $\exp(B)$  around  $A$ ,  $\exp(B) = \exp(A) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(B-A)^j}{j!}$ , to rewrite the decision rule, which has the form  $\exp(B) - \exp(A) \cdot L \geq K$ . Noting that in this context,

$$B - A = (E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^1 | W^1 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^1)^2) - (E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2) = \rho_{i25} + 0.5((\sigma_i^1)^2 - (\sigma_i^0)^2),$$

I can write the decision rule as

$$\begin{aligned} & \exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2) \cdot \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\rho_{i25} + 0.5((\sigma_i^1)^2 - (\sigma_i^0)^2))^j}{j!} \right) \\ & - (\exp(E_{18}(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)) \cdot (1 + r_i)^4 \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(3\gamma_1)}{\exp(7\gamma_0)} \\ & - (1 + r_i)^3 \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1}} (1 + r_i - \exp(\gamma_1)) \\ & \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging will lead to

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\rho_{i25} + 0.5((\sigma_i^1)^2 - (\sigma_i^0)^2))^j}{j!} \\ & - (1 + r_i)^4 \left[ \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(3\gamma_1)}{\exp(7\gamma_0)} + \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} \right] \\ & + (1 + r_i)^3 \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} \exp(\gamma_1) \\ & \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus using the data on subjective expectations, the latent variable model for attending university can be written as

$$S = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } S^* \geq U, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 S^* = & \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\rho_{i25} + 0.5((\sigma_i^1)^2 - (\sigma_i^0)^2))^j}{j!} \\
 & - (1 + r_i)^4 \left[ \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(3\gamma_1)}{\exp(7\gamma_0)} \right. \\
 & \left. + \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} \right] \\
 & + (1 + r_i)^3 \frac{C_i}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} \exp(\gamma_1).
 \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

*Derivation of the testable prediction of excess responsiveness*

Making use of the participation equation for college attendance (see equation (16)), the following results show that individuals who face a higher interest rate are more responsive to changes in direct costs,

$$\frac{\partial S^*}{\partial C} = \frac{-(1 + r_i)^4 + (1 + r_i)^3 \exp(\gamma_1)}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} < 0 \tag{17}$$

as  $\exp(\gamma_1) < 1 + r_i$  (see the previous section). Furthermore,

$$\frac{\partial^2 S^*}{\partial C \partial r} = \frac{-4(1 + r_i)^3 + 3(1 + r_i)^2 \exp(\gamma_1)}{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)} < 0 \tag{18}$$

as  $4(1 + r_i) > 3 \exp(\gamma_1)$ .

Thus  $|\frac{\partial S^*}{\partial C}|$  is increasing in  $r_i$ . As  $P(S = 1) = \Phi(S^*)$ , which is a monotonic transformation of  $S^*$ , also  $|\frac{\partial P(S=1)}{\partial C}|$  is increasing in  $r$  and thus individuals who face a higher interest rate are more responsive to changes in direct costs.

*Participation equation as a fourth-order polynomial in the interest rate*

The participation equation (16) can be expressed as a polynomial in the interest rate under the assumption that all unobserved heterogeneity stems from the unobserved interest rate  $r$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (1 + r)^4 - (1 + r)^3 \frac{C \exp(\gamma_1)}{(p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)) \cdot \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(\gamma_1 3)}{\exp(\gamma_0 7)} + C} \\
 & - \frac{p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)}{(p_i^C p_i^{W1} \exp(E(\ln Y_{i25}^0 | W^0 = 1) + 0.5(\sigma_i^0)^2)) \cdot \frac{p_i^{W0}}{p_i^{W1}} \cdot \frac{\exp(\gamma_1 3)}{\exp(\gamma_0 7)} + C} \\
 & \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\rho_i + 0.5((\sigma_i^1)^2 - (\sigma_i^0)^2))^j}{j!}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

*Derivation of the marginal return to college*

The derivation of equation (10) is

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(U_1 - U_0 | U_S \leq p) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (U_1 - U_0) f(U_1 - U_0 | U_S \leq p) d(u_1 - u_0) \\
 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (U_1 - U_0) \frac{\int_0^p f(U_1 - U_0, U_S) du_S}{\Pr(U_S \leq p)} d(u_1 - u_0) \\
 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (U_1 - U_0) \frac{\int_0^p f(U_1 - U_0 | U_S) f(u_S) du_S}{p} d(u_1 - u_0) \\
 &= \frac{1}{p} \int_0^p E(U_1 - U_0 | U_S = u_S) du_S.
 \end{aligned}$$

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