

Fiscal Rules and Compliance Expectations

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Motivation

- ▶ Fiscal Rules are used in many countries to limit budget deficits and debts (e.g., Switzerland, US states, EU Fiscal Framework)
- ▶ Effectiveness depends on credibility and flexibility in the presence of economic crisis

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- ▶ Fiscal Rules are used in many countries to limit budget deficits and debts (e.g., Switzerland, US states, EU Fiscal Framework)
- ▶ Effectiveness depends on credibility and flexibility in the presence of economic crisis
- ▶ Little theoretical work on fiscal rules when political distortions and fiscal shocks (Azzimonti, Battaglini and Coate, 2016)
- ▶ Standard empirical approach estimates the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal performance (meta study by Heinemann et al., 2015)
 - ▶ identification challenges due to endogeneity of fiscal rule (IV estimation, e.g., Asatryan et al. 2016)
 - ▶ to be effective policy makers must believe in credibility of fiscal rules

Fiscal rule in Germany

- ▶ Delayed implementation of German debt brake (“Schuldenbremse”)
 - ▶ Became part of the German constitution in 2009 (Federalism Reform II)
 - ▶ Limits structural deficit at federal level to less than 0.35% of GDP, starting in 2016
 - ▶ Limits structural deficit at state (“Länder”) level to zero (=balanced budget), starting in 2020
 - ▶ Fiscal supervision by Stability Council, no/weak direct sanctions however (new legislation passed in 2017, some details still unclear)

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 - ▶ Fiscal supervision by Stability Council, no/weak direct sanctions however (new legislation passed in 2017, some details still unclear)
- ▶ Delay allows analysis of fiscal rule effects on beliefs of policymakers
 - ▶ two surveys of members of German state parliaments level in 2011/2 and 2015/6

Agenda

- ▶ Do fiscal rules affect beliefs of policymakers?
- ▶ What determines beliefs in compliance and consequences in case of non-compliance?
 - ▶ individual characteristics (e.g., education)
 - ▶ economic fundamentals (e.g., existing debt level, economic growth)
 - ▶ political factors (e.g., incumbency, party membership)?

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 - ▶ economic fundamentals (e.g., existing debt level, economic growth)
 - ▶ political factors (e.g., incumbency, party membership)?
- ▶ Analysis based on two projects:
 - ▶ F. Heinemann, E. Janeba, C. Schröder, F. Streif: Fiscal Rules and compliance expectations, Journal of Public Economics 2016
 - ▶ S. Blesse, F. Heinemann, E. Janeba, M. Todtenhaupt (work in progress)
- ▶ Project part of Collaborative Research Center 884 “Political Economy of Reforms” at University of Mannheim (2010-2021)

Outline

- ▶ very short version of theoretical model
- ▶ analysis of first survey (2011/2): cross-sectional
- ▶ analysis of first and second survey (2015/6): panel structure

Model of Fiscal Rule Compliance (short version)

- ▶ Three period economy $t = 0, 1, 2$
- ▶ Initial deficit (exogenous) $d_0 > 0$
- ▶ Fiscal rule (i.e., debt brake) requires $d_2 \leq 0$
- ▶ Compliance with fiscal rule gives government payoff higher payoff than non-compliance (due to reputation loss)
- ▶ Permanent deficit reduction in period 1 and 2 by $r_1 \geq 0$ and $r_2 \geq 0$ is costly for government

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- ▶ Permanent deficit reduction in period 1 and 2 by $r_1 \geq 0$ and $r_2 \geq 0$ is costly for government
- ▶ Period 1 deficit: $d_1 = d_0 - r_1 + s$, where $s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}]$ is a uniform deficit shock
- ▶ Period 2 deficit: $d_2 = d_1 - r_2$

Model continued

- ▶ Government maximizes discounted lifetime payoff
 - ▶ deficit reduction optimally chosen (compliance and non-compliance)
- ▶ In period 2: government complies if and only if $s \leq s^* = c^{-1}(\Delta u) + r_1 - d_0$, where
 - ▶ s^* is the maximum deficit shock that makes government indifferent
 - ▶ Δu is the utility difference between complying and optimal non-compliance

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 - ▶ deficit reduction optimally chosen (compliance and non-compliance)
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 - ▶ s^* is the maximum deficit shock that makes government indifferent
 - ▶ Δu is the utility difference between complying and optimal non-compliance
- ▶ **Probability of compliance** (given r_1 , but before realization of shock s)

$$p = \frac{s^* - \underline{s}}{\bar{s} - \underline{s}} \in [0, 1]$$

- ▶ in published paper: full comparative static analysis taking endogeneity of r_1 into account

Predictions

- ▶ Probability of compliance declines with initial deficit d_0 (H1).
- ▶ Probability of compliance declines with higher bail out expectations in case of non-compliance via Δu (H2).
- ▶ Outsiders (out of state politicians, opposition parties) have weaker compliance beliefs than insiders (in state politicians, incumbents) due to overconfidence (=downward shift of shock distribution parameters $s \in [\underline{s}, \bar{s}]$) (H4)

First Survey 2011/2

- ▶ Survey of members of **16 German state parliaments** 2011 and 2012
- ▶ **Non-anonymous survey**
 - ▶ Confidentiality at individual level assured
 - ▶ Information on party membership, education, committee membership, age, etc. publicly available
- ▶ Contact: letter to politicians, followed by email (with online link); phone call
- ▶ **639 survey answers**; response rate: 34% (state variation between 20% and 56%)


Beliefs in Compliance Across States

- ▶ Survey Question: “Which of the 16 German states will comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020 with high probability?” (binary answer)
- ▶ 10224 observations (639 politicians, 16 states)


Beliefs in Compliance Across States

- ▶ Survey Question: “Which of the 16 German states will comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020 with high probability?” (binary answer)
- ▶ 10224 observations (639 politicians, 16 states)
- ▶ Stylized facts:
 - ▶ Only four states for which majority of all politicians believes in compliance
 - ▶ Often large differences in views of politicians from own state vs. from outside state

Compliance: Across State Views



Own vs. outside assessment of compliance



Consequences of Non-Compliance

- ▶ Credibility of debt brake unclear; fiscal situation in some states weak
- ▶ Survey Question: “What will happen if German states do not comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020?”
- ▶ Multiple answers possible
 - ▶ hard consequence: sanctions, constitutional interventions in budget autonomy, merger of states
 - ▶ soft consequence: relaxation of debt brake, transfer payment to non-complying state, nothing
- ▶ We construct an index of perceived strength of fiscal rule at individual politician level
 - ▶ index mean 0.31 (Interval [-7,+7])

Economic Indicators

Table: Economic and Fiscal Indicators 2011/2

	Population 2011 (in millions)	GDP per capita 2011 (in 1000s of €)	Total debt to GDP ratio 2011 (in %)	Need for Consoli- dat. (CEE)	Bond Rating 2012	Stringency of state debt rule
Germany/Federal Government	81.84	44.02	49.79	-	AAA	
Baden-Württemberg	10.79	34.89	17.16	0.10	AAA	0.62
Bavaria	12.60	35.44	6.79	-0.60	AAA	0.48
Berlin	3.50	28.95	61.64	3.50	Aa1	0.65
Brandenburg	2.50	22.08	35.77	2.10	Aa1	0.51
Bremen	0.66	42.39	73.63	3.40	-	0.64
Hamburg	1.80	52.49	26.86	0.30	-	0.47
Hesse	6.09	37.51	17.28	1.30	AA	0.50
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania	1.63	21.40	29.11	1.70	-	0.46
Lower Saxony	7.91	28.35	25.42	1.30	-	0.55
North Rhine-Westphalia	17.84	31.88	33.22	1.60	AA	0.45
Rhineland-Palatinate	4.00	28.31	32.49	1.80	AAA	0.69
Saarland	1.01	30.10	41.83	2.80	-	0.70
Saxony	4.14	22.98	9.99	0.60	AAA	0.76
Saxony-Anhalt	2.31	22.43	39.84	2.50	AA+	0.77
Schleswig-Holstein	2.84	25.95	38.57	1.30	AAA	0.77
Thuringia	2.22	21.66	35.04	2.30	AAA	0.66

Econometric Approach

- ▶ (Ordered) Probit with compliance expectation as dependent variable
- ▶ Home state or person fixed effects; cluster standard errors for state pairs
- ▶ Robustness checks
 - ▶ Weighing regressions with inverse of response rate (along party and state dimensions)
 - ▶ State level data for year prior to survey
 - ▶ Unit-non response analysis

Likelihood of compliance: Baseline Results

	(1)		(2)	
Independent Variables	Baseline 1	Average marginal effects	Baseline 2	Average marginal effects
Individual: education		
Individual: parliamentary role				
Member of governing parties in state (H4)	0.207***	0.056***		
Member of budget committee	-0.162***	-0.044***		
Number of years in parliament	-0.006***	-0.002***		
Individual: other				
Female	-0.111***	-0.030***		
Age in years	0.002	0.001		
Individual: preferences and bailout-expectation				
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H2)	0.046***	0.012***		
Preference of fiscal consolidation (debt reduction)	0.004***	0.001***		
Desirability of own state's compliance	0.066***	0.018***		
Individual: party affiliation		
State characteristics				
Average budget deficit over last three years (H1)	-0.326***	-0.088***	-0.567***	-0.098***
GDP per capita	0.027***	0.007***	0.023***	0.004***
State debt rule index (H3)	2.730***	0.734***	4.005***	0.691***
Dummy for consolidation assistance	-0.718***	-0.193***	-1.074***	-0.185***
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP	-0.356***	-0.096***	-0.719***	-0.124***
Government coalition consists of right parties	0.589***	0.158***	0.788***	0.136***
Cross state dimension				
Own state (H4)	0.801***	0.215***	1.213***	0.209***
Home state fixed effects	✓	✓		
Person fixed effects			✓	✓

Results

- ▶ H1: A one percentage point higher initial average deficit lowers the probability that state is compliant by 9 PP
- ▶ H2: Difference between very soft and very hard budget constraint perception amounts to 18 PP higher probability
- ▶ H4: In-state politicians believe in own compliance more than out-of-state politicians (22 PP); incumbent government more than opposition 6 PP

Results

- ▶ H1: A one percentage point higher initial average deficit lowers the probability that state is compliant by 9 PP
- ▶ H2: Difference between very soft and very hard budget constraint perception amounts to 18 PP higher probability
- ▶ H4: In-state politicians believe in own compliance more than out-of-state politicians (22 PP); incumbent government more than opposition 6 PP
- ▶ further analysis (not shown) suggests that compared to out-of-state politicians in-state politicians are overconfident rather than better informed

Second Survey 2015/6

- ▶ 663 respondents (response rate 36%)
- ▶ 244 repeaters from first survey
- ▶ collected by state in three steps:
 - ▶ 12/2014 until 1/2015
 - ▶ 5/2015 until 6/2015
 - ▶ 2/2016 until 4/2016

Economic and fiscal recovery

- ▶ Favorable economic and fiscal conditions evolving in Germany since 2011
 - ▶ declining interest rates
 - ▶ recovering economic growth

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Real GDP growth	3.7	0.5	0.5	1.6	1.7	1.9

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Real GDP growth	3.7	0.5	0.5	1.6	1.7	1.9


- ▶ Compliance with fiscal rule should become easier; however
 - ▶ Possibly negative fiscal shock from large refugee inflow in 2015
 - ▶ real time estimate (winter 2015/6) of additional govt. expenditure for 2016: 0.5% of GDP
 - ▶ distribution of refugees across states by formula (based on tax revenue and population)

Annual yield 10 year federal government bond



▶ source: Deutsche Bundesbank

Refugee inflow to Germany 2015 and 2016




- ▶
- ▶ Source: Council of economic experts, Annual report 2016/7

Compliance expectations I

- assessment of own state compliance: answer scale [-4,+4]: “In your view how probable do you think is it that your state will comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020 and have a balanced budget (cyclically adjusted)?”

Abbildung 2: Wahrscheinlichkeit der Befolgung der Schuldenbremse durch das eigene Bundesland


Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Ihr Bundesland die Vorgaben der grundgesetzlichen Schuldenbremse ab 2020 einhalten wird?



Alle Angaben in Prozent, Quelle: eigene Berechnungen


Compliance expectations II

- own state compliance, 1st vs. 2nd survey



Consequences of non-compliance

- ▶ comparison 1st survey (left) and 2nd survey (right)



- ▶
- ▶ hard: constitutional courts (dark blue), sanctions (orange), interventions (grey), state mergers (red)
- ▶ soft: relaxation of fiscal rule (brown), financial transfers (green), nothing (light blue)

Econometric model

- ▶ $y_{ij} = \alpha POST_i + \beta X_{ij} + \phi_i + \phi_j$, where
 - ▶ y_{ij} is the response of parliamentarian i in survey $j=1,2$ (compliance own state, consequence non-compliance)
 - ▶ $POST_i$ is a dummy that indicates whether parliamentarian i responded before or after peak of refugee inflow (Sept. 2015)
 - ▶ X_{ij} is a set of individual and state control variables
 - ▶ fixed effects for each member of parliament (ϕ_i) and survey (ϕ_j)
- ▶ difference-in-difference approach: survey 1 vs. survey 2, within survey 2 before vs. after peak refugee inflow

Econometric model cont.

- ▶ $y_{ij} = \alpha_1 POST_i + \alpha_2 POST_i \times GOVT_{ij} + \alpha_3 GOVT_{ij} + \beta X_{ij} + \phi_i + \phi_j$
- ▶ $GOVT_{ij}$ is a dummy that equals one if parliamentarian i is member of a governing party when responding to wave j
 - ▶ Identification comes from changes in governing parties due to 21 state elections between 2011 and 2016

Result: Own state compliance

Table 1: Own-compliance to Debt Brake (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POST	-0.963* (0.511)	-0.797 (0.525)	-1.662* (0.926)	-2.615*** (0.996)
POST x GOVT				1.734* (0.891)
GOVT		1.810*** (0.522)	1.909*** (0.542)	1.718*** (0.570)
Age		-2.095*** (0.330)	-1.889*** (0.414)	-1.914*** (0.416)
Member of Budget Committee		-0.012 (0.201)	0.014 (0.211)	0.025 (0.211)
Debt to GDP			-0.091 (0.097)	-0.071 (0.099)
Loan Finance Quotient			-0.009 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.036)
Structural Balance			0.460 (0.754)	0.681 (0.862)
Log Population			18.306 (16.605)	20.205 (16.479)
Observations	1,302	1,302	1,302	1,302
Respondents	1,058	1,058	1,058	1,058
R ²	0.061	0.152	0.158	0.172



Result: Expected strictness of debt brake

Table 1: Index on Expected Strictness of Debt Brake (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
POST	-1.988*** (0.662)	-1.760** (0.732)	-2.349* (1.232)	-2.956** (1.452)
POST x GOVT				1.140 (1.194)
GOVT		0.343 (0.751)	0.357 (0.817)	0.232 (0.850)
Age		3.968*** (0.486)	4.332*** (0.647)	4.317*** (0.656)
Member of Budget Committee		-0.128 (0.276)	-0.139 (0.297)	-0.127 (0.296)
Debt to GDP			-0.116 (0.141)	-0.104 (0.146)
Loan Finance Quotient			0.023 (0.047)	0.022 (0.047)
Structural Balance			0.343 (0.874)	0.483 (0.897)
Log Population			22.761 (21.596)	23.878 (21.671)
Observations	1,308	1,308	1,308	1,308
Respondents	1,063	1,063	1,063	1,063
R ²	0.040	0.054	0.061	0.065



Conclusion

- ▶ Fiscal rules are effective only when beliefs of policy makers are affected
- ▶ Analysis of German fiscal rule that becomes binding in 2020 using repeat surveys of policymakers
 - ▶ insiders (in-state politicians, member of government coalition parties) are more optimistic than outsiders (out of state, opposition) regarding compliance
 - ▶ respondents from governing parties retained their positive perception of their state's fiscal rule compliance after fiscal shock (opposition members not)
 - ▶ parliamentarians expected a weaker enforcement after the refugee inflow, no heterogeneity between governing and non-governing parties

What explains in-state vs. out-of-state expectations?

- ▶ Two rival model-based hypotheses (see Heinemann et al. JPubE, 2016)
 - ▶ **Overconfidence of insiders:** Then $p^{ins} > p^{out}$.
 - ▶ **Noisier information of outsiders:** **If insiders believe in compliance with more than 50% probability, then $p^{ins} > p^{out}$. If insiders find compliance less likely than non-compliance, outsiders are more optimistic than insiders: $p^{ins} < p^{out}$.**
- ▶ Empirical strategy: Split sample in optimistic and pessimistic states by own-state assessment

Likelihood of compliance (sample split)

	(1)	$p^{HS} < 0.5$	(2)	$p^{HS} > 0.5$
Independent Variables	Baseline for BE, HB, NW, SL, TH	Average marginal effects	Baseline for 11 other states	Average marginal effects
Individual: education
Individual: parliamentary role				
Member of governing parties in state (H)	0.201**	0.036**	0.217***	0.063***
Member of budget committee	-0.176**	-0.032**	-0.164***	-0.048***
Number of years in parliament	-0.011**	-0.002**	-0.005*	-0.001*
Individual: other				
Female	-0.268***	-0.048***	-0.069*	-0.020*
Age in years	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001
Individual: preference and bailout-expectation				
Index for perceived strength of budget constraint (H)	0.062***	0.011***	0.043***	0.013***
Preference for fiscal consolidation (debt reduction)	0.004***	0.001***	0.004***	0.001***
Desirability of own state's compliance	0.049***	0.009***	0.073***	0.021***
Individual: party affiliation
State characteristics				
Average budget deficit over last 3 years (H)	-0.059	-0.011	-0.627	-0.182***
GDP per capita	0.010	0.002	-0.004	-0.001
State debt rule index (H)	4.120**	0.741**	2.509***	0.728***
Dummy for consolidation assistance	-1.155***	-0.208***	-0.695***	-0.202***
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP	-0.047	-0.008	-0.901***	-0.261***
Government coalition consists of right parties	0.069	0.012	0.277***	0.080***
Cross state dimension				
Own state (H)	0.491***	0.088***	0.902***	0.262***
Home state fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Cross state evaluations 2011/2

Table: Cross-state compliance expectations

Evaluating/Evaluated States	BB	BE	BW	BY	HB	HE	HH	MV	NI	NW	RP	SH	SL	SN	ST	TH	Average
BB	53	5	68	89	0	58	53	11	37	16	32	5	11	68	16	37	35
BE	13	33	70	73	0	67	37	30	47	10	23	13	10	57	27	50	35
BW	5	0	75	93	1	58	22	16	17	9	19	8	4	71	5	19	26
BY	3	3	57	89	3	53	21	4	25	5	17	7	4	61	5	32	24
HB	11	0	67	72	11	56	28	28	50	11	28	6	6	56	28	22	30
HE	10	2	56	76	2	78	26	18	34	10	16	8	8	58	16	32	28
HH	21	8	72	74	0	62	67	31	44	15	36	8	3	54	21	28	34
MV	6	0	72	78	0	53	41	83	24	0	12	0	6	78	12	29	31
NI	4	0	74	91	2	57	24	19	56	11	26	11	6	54	20	26	30
NW	6	4	67	82	0	53	10	24	45	16	29	10	4	61	20	31	29
RP	14	0	76	78	4	64	28	20	36	14	52	12	4	64	22	40	33
SH	10	7	65	86	10	55	17	24	38	10	21	66	10	52	28	31	33
SL	20	5	95	100	5	85	45	20	55	10	35	20	30	55	25	35	40
SN	11	0	67	80	2	42	11	29	20	0	13	4	0	89	16	42	27
ST	24	3	76	83	7	52	28	45	35	14	28	17	17	72	59	45	38
TH	22	11	67	97	11	69	22	31	47	19	33	28	11	89	28	47	40
Average MSP	12	4	69	85	3	59	27	23	36	10	26	13	7	65	19	33	31
Average State	15	5	70	84	4	60	30	27	38	11	26	14	8	65	22	34	32

Cross State Evaluation 2015/6

Table OA1: Cross-state compliance expectations

	Evaluated states																\emptyset	
	BB	BE	BW	BY	HB	HE	HH	MV	NI	NW	RP	SH	SL	SN	ST	TH		
Evaluating states	BB	35	5	55	65	0	50	15	10	10	5	20	10	0	35	5	20	21
	BE	24	51	66	66	5	61	39	22	17	10	27	22	10	49	22	27	32
	BW	10	10	75	87	1	55	37	18	19	4	19	12	4	58	18	22	28
	BY	7	4	64	89	1	54	28	8	14	4	17	7	4	49	8	18	24
	HB	4	0	52	60	12	44	44	8	4	0	12	4	0	24	8	4	18
	HE	10	8	63	74	2	59	27	16	18	2	16	12	8	47	16	18	25
	HH	13	3	57	67	3	50	53	23	23	10	20	17	3	27	10	17	27
	MV	4	0	58	79	4	50	38	75	17	13	13	8	4	50	8	17	31
	NI	22	2	63	76	0	51	36	19	49	14	37	25	3	51	19	32	24
	NW	11	7	53	64	3	33	26	10	22	29	21	11	4	44	21	22	35
	RP	23	9	74	85	2	59	26	28	38	15	43	21	2	74	26	36	40
	SH	16	0	75	88	0	69	63	28	41	19	38	59	9	69	38	31	26
	SL	6	0	59	65	0	53	35	18	24	18	18	24	18	35	18	24	22
	SN	13	2	48	73	2	31	17	19	17	10	15	15	2	71	4	19	31
	ST	25	8	53	73	0	45	23	38	25	15	15	20	8	60	58	28	31
	TH	3	3	50	75	0	42	17	11	14	3	11	3	6	50	6	17	19
\emptyset_{State}	14	7	60	74	2	50	33	22	22	11	21	17	5	49	18	22		
$\emptyset_{15\text{ other states}}$	13	4	59	73	2	50	31	18	20	9	20	14	4	48	15	22		

Note: Figures are in percent and indicate the share of MSPs who expect that the evaluated state will be compliant. \emptyset_{MSP} indicates the average over all MSPs. \emptyset_{State} indicates the unweighted average over the state figures. $\emptyset_{15\text{ other states}}$ indicates the unweighted average over all states except the evaluated state.

Tabelle 1: Antwortquoten und Zeitpunkt der Umfrage nach Bundesländern

Bundesland	Anzahl der Landtags-abgeordneten	Antworten	Antwort- quote	Umfrage- zeitpunkt	Letzte Land- tagswahl vor Befragung
Baden-Württemberg	138	78	56,52%	1	3/2011
Bayern	180	69	38,33%	2	9/2013
Berlin	149	38	25,50%	1	9/2011
Brandenburg	88	18	20,45%	3	9/2014
Bremen	83	24	28,92%	3	5/2015
Hamburg	121	27	22,31%	3	2/2015
Hessen	110	46	41,82%	3	9/2013
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	71	23	32,39%	1	9/2011
Niedersachsen	137	53	38,69%	2	1/2013
Nordrhein-Westfalen	237	84	35,44%	2	5/2012
Rheinland-Pfalz	101	52	51,49%	1	3/2011
Saarland	51	15	29,41%	2	3/2012
Sachsen	126	40	31,75%	3	8/2014
Sachsen-Anhalt	105	36	34,29%	1	3/2011
Schleswig-Holstein	69	31	44,93%	2	5/2012
Thüringen	91	34	37,36%	3	9/2014
Gesamt	1857	669	36,03%		


Anmerkung: Umfragezeitpunkt 1: Dezember 2014/Januar 2015, 2: Mai/Juni 2015, 3: Februar/März/April 2016



Compliance expectations III

- ▶ “Which states are going to comply with high probability”
(binary answer)

Abbildung 3: Wahrscheinlichkeit der Befolgung der Schuldenbremse nach Bundesländern




Quelle: eigene Berechnungen

Anmerkung: BY=Bayern, BW=Baden-Württemberg, SN=Sachsen, HE=Hessen, NI=Niedersachsen, TH=Thüringen, HH=Hamburg, RP=Rheinland-Pfalz, MV=Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ST=Sachsen-Anhalt, SH=Schleswig-Holstein, BB=Brandenburg, NW=Nordrhein-Westfalen, SA=Saarland, BE=Berlin und HB=Bremen.

Overview by State

How probable do you think it is that your Bundesland will comply with the constitutional debt brake as of 2020?



Graphs by Bundesland

Response Rate

Table 1: Response rates

	Number of members of parliament	Number of responses	Response rate
Overall	1861	639	34.34%
Baden-Württemberg	138	77	55.80%
Bavaria	187	75	40.11%
Berlin	149	30	20.13%
Brandenburg	88	19	21.59%
Bremen	83	18	21.69%
Hamburg	124	39	31.45%
Hesse	114	50	43.86%
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania	71	17	23.94%
Lower Saxony	152	54	35.53%
North Rhine-Westphalia	181	51	28.18%
Rhineland-Palatinate	101	50	49.50%
Saarland	51	20	39.22%
Saxony	133	45	33.83%
Saxony-Anhalt	106	47	44.79%
Schleswig-Holstein	95	29	30.53%
Thuringia	88	36	40.91%