

# THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK IN GERMANY – AUTONOMY AND JOINT RESPONSIBILITY

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# Germany: A federal country

- **Four layers of government**
  - Federal government
  - 16 State governments (*Länder*)
  - About 11,000 local governments
  - Social insurance
- **Expenditures shares**
  - (≈10% of GDP)
  - (≈11% of GDP)
  - (≈7% of GDP)
  - (≈19% of GDP)
- Note: Only core budgets, substantial fiscal equalization and vertical transfers between government layers

# Autonomy and Joint Responsibility

- Art. 109 Basic Law establishes that the federal government and the state governments (Länder) are
  - autonomous of another in budgetary matters
  - jointly responsible for the obligations from European Union treaty/SGP
- How can that work?

# Three Elements

1. Allocation of EU financial sanctions relating to Art. 126 TFEU
  - Federal government/Länder share burden 65/35%
  - Distribution within Länder 65% by causation, 35% by population shares
  
2. National fiscal rule: Debt Brake
  - Federal government: structural deficit of no more than 0.35% of GDP (from 2016 onwards)
  - Länder: Structurally balanced budget (from 2020 onwards)
  
3. Fiscal surveillance by Stability Council
  - Preventing budgetary emergencies through monitoring

# Debt Brake („Schuldenbremse“)

- Issue 1: Which method is used for business cycle adjustment?
  - Federal government: EU method
  - Länder: their choice!

⇒ Possible tension between European and national fiscal rules
- Issue 2: Aggregating deficits across government layers
  - Fiscal Compact Deficit target (0.5%) vs. debt brake (0.35% + 0)
  - Local governments autonomous but fiscal surveillance and fiscal transfers by Länder
  - Deficits in Social Insurance can be covered by decline in reserves, which deteriorates budgetary position from national accounts perspective

## Germany's Budgetary Position (% of GDP)


	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Surplus	0.7	1/2	1/4	1/4	1/2	1/2
Federal govt.	0.3	0	0	0	1/4	1/4
Länder	0.2	1/4	1/4	1/4	0	1/4
Local govt.	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
Social Insurance	0.1	1/4	0	0	0	0

Note: Structural deficit in some years worse due to negative output gap.

Source: Documents, Stability Council meeting December 12, 2016

# Fiscal Monitoring

- Stability Council
  - 16 Länder finance ministers
  - federal finance and economy ministers
- Monitoring of federal and Länder budgets over medium term using indicator-based system
  - Structural fiscal balance per capita
  - Credit financing ratio
  - Debt per capita
  - Interest-to-tax ratio
- Stability Council declares state of budgetary emergency
  - agreement and monitoring of budgetary rehabilitation program



# Structural deficit indicator (€ p.c.)

Struktureller Finanzierungssaldo in € je Einwohner

	Bund*	BW	BY	BB	HE	MV	NI	NW	RP	SL	SN	ST	SH	TH	BE	HB	HH
2014	127	90	93	228	-75	61	-11	-88	-28	-593	385	52	13	78	214	-767	240
2015	164	76	93	226	41	138	-54	-15	30	-444	189	198	35	158	143	-835	117
2016	-82	-164	-138	-57	-117	-39	-83	-117	-68	-426	104	-68	-84	7	41	-1.179	-99
2017	-51	67	-24	-33	-45	-4	-98	-86	-49	-384	87	-21	-29	-64	30	-1.038	1
2018	30	65	21	2	40	39	-51	-14	-19	-283	96	47	39	26	11	-612	109
2019	44	102	25	14	67	40	-12	31	15	-168	167	70	55	29	-2	-355	179
2020	10		50	10	74	42	1	88	94	74	147		63	31	-7	-158	241

- Source: Stability Council, 14th meeting, Dec. 12, 2016



# Discussion

- Issue 1: Weak enforcement power of Stability Council
  - Lack of sanction mechanism (withdrawal of temporary consolidation assistance?)
- Issue 2: No monitoring of Debt Brake (yet)
  - new legislation currently in parliamentary process
  - details on monitoring system and enforcement capacity unclear
- Issue 3: Who is independent fiscal institution?
  - Stability Council is a fiscal council, but not independent; Advisory Board is independent, but by itself not a fiscal council
  - Advisory Board consults only with respect to Fiscal compact, not monitoring of budgetary emergency or debt brake

# Conclusion

- In a federation there is a tension between budgetary autonomy for all government layers and joint responsibility for aggregate fiscal outcomes
- Solution needs clear rules, coordination and monitoring institution (in Germany: Stability Council + Advisory Board)
- Actual system is the outcome of a delicate power balance between federal government and Länder
- Some institutional frictions remain; Germany's fiscal framework not tested in crisis yet