

Wie verfasst man ein Korreferat?

Hinweis: Das folgende Dokument dient als erste Orientierung, falls Sie im Rahmen eines Seminars nicht nur ein eigenes Referat, sondern auch ein Korreferat halten müssen. Bitte beachten Sie in jedem Fall die Vorgaben Ihres Dozenten, der ggf. weitere Anforderungen an ein Korreferat stellt.

Was ist ein Korreferat? Ein Korreferat ist strenggenommen eine Stellungnahme zu einem vorangegangenen Hauptreferat. Es fasst nicht nur die wesentlichen Inhalte des Hauptreferats zusammen, sondern würdigt dieses kritisch und sachlich. Ziel ist es, konstruktive Denkanstöße zu geben, um die ursprüngliche Arbeit zu verbessern oder zu erweitern. Dabei sollten sowohl positive Leistungen als auch Schwächen des Hauptreferats zur Sprache kommen. Im Rahmen Ihres Studiums wird sich das Korreferat allerdings seltener auf ein vorangegangenes Hauptreferat als auf eine zugrundeliegende Seminararbeit eines Kommilitonen beziehen. Gewöhnlich erhalten Sie also im Vorfeld die noch unbenotete Seminararbeit zugeschickt und sollen auf dieser Grundlage das Korreferat erstellen. Im Seminar wird dann zunächst der Kommilitone die Seminararbeit in einem Referat vorstellen; Sie werden unmittelbar im Anschluss die Seminararbeit kommentieren. Selbstverständlich ist es möglich (und wünschenswert), dass Sie in Ihrem Vortrag auf das Hauptreferat eingehen; beispielsweise indem Sie darauf hinweisen, dass Argument X in der Seminararbeit zwar wenig fundiert erschien, im Referat jedoch sehr gut hergeleitet wurde.

Abgrenzung zum Hauptreferat: Im Gegensatz zum Hauptreferat, welches in der Regel einen fremden wissenschaftlichen Artikel darlegt, bewertet das Korreferat die Leistung des Referenten. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei eine konstruktive inhaltliche Kritik, die sich je nach Vorgaben entweder auf die schriftliche Seminararbeit, die mündliche Präsentation der Seminararbeit oder auf beides bezieht. In diesem Sinne weist das Korreferat Ähnlichkeiten zu einer Buchbesprechung oder einem Gutachten auf. Falls sich Ihr Kommilitone in seiner Seminararbeit beispielsweise mit dem Artikel „Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs“ von Baron und Roger (1982) befasst, so ist es seine Aufgabe, das methodische Vorgehen der beiden Wissenschaftler zu würdigen. Ihre Aufgabe hingegen ist es, das methodische Vorgehen Ihres Kommilitonen zu bewerten und darzulegen, inwieweit er seinerseits die Aufgabenstellung adäquat erfüllt hat.

Bestandteile des Korreferats: Das Korreferat beginnt i. d. R. mit einer kurzen Zusammenfassung der ursprünglichen Arbeit (inklusive Nennung des Autors/ der Autorin sowie Titel der Seminararbeit), gefolgt von einer kritischen Würdigung ausgewählter Aspekte und/oder Argumente. Darüber hinaus kann das Korreferat folgende Teile umfassen (kein Muss):

- Darstellung der positiven Aspekte
- Vertretung einer Gegenmeinung
- Vorschlag alternativer Herangehensweisen, beispielsweise die Wahl einer anderen Struktur, Theorie oder Methode
- Im Falle einer Datenerhebung: Wie ist die Datenqualität und -quantität zu bewerten? Sind die Daten repräsentativ und der Fragestellung angemessen?
- Hinweis auf offene Fragen oder weitere Implikationen
- Verständnisfragen (Was ist möglicherweise unklar geblieben? Werden Begriffe klar abgegrenzt?)

- Anmerkung oder Ergänzung unklarer und/oder fehlender Aspekte
 - Kommentar der ausgewählten Literatur (Sind genügend Quellen ausgewertet worden? Sind die Quellen zitierfähig, zitierwürdig und relevant? Hätte etwas besser gemacht werden können?)
- Bitte verzichten Sie in jedem Fall auf eine unsachliche Kritik an Ihren Kommilitonen und auf eine reine Nacherzählung des Hauptreferats bzw. der Seminararbeit.

Orientierungsfragen bei der Bewertung der Seminararbeit: Folgende Fragen können Ihnen bei dem Verfassen des Korreferats helfen:

- Ist die Gliederung der Arbeit schlüssig und ein roter Faden erkennbar? Sind die Gliederungspunkte nachvollziehbar gewichtet?
- Werden die Fragestellung der Arbeit und die Relevanz des Themas erörtert?
- Ist die theoretische Grundlage fundiert und ausreichend erklärt? Passt die Theorie zur Fragestellung?
- Ist die Methodik und die Datengrundlage klar? Werden mathematische Formeln schlüssig hergeleitet? Gibt es methodische Schwächen der Arbeit?
- Ist die Arbeit sprachlich konsistent und nachvollziehbar gestaltet? Werden Fachtermini präzise definiert und einheitlich verwendet?
- Werden dargestellte Inhalte durch Schaubilder und Tabellen visualisiert? Tragen die Abbildungen zum besseren Verständnis bei?
- Wird im Ergebnis- und Diskussionsteil schlüssig argumentiert? Werden Schwächen der Arbeit kritisch genannt und Verbesserungsvorschläge unterbreitet?
- Wie ist der Umgang mit Quellen zu bewerten?

Anmerkungen zum Vortrag: Das Korreferat dauert in der Regel zwischen 5 und 10 Minuten und schließt meist direkt an das Hauptreferat an. Je nach zeitlichem Rahmen können Sie auf eine inhaltliche Zusammenfassung der vorangegangenen Arbeit verzichten und sich stattdessen ausschließlich auf die kritische Würdigung konzentrieren. Gehen Sie dabei zunächst auf positive Aspekte an und leiten Sie dann zu den negativen Punkten über, die Sie immer gut begründen sollten. Das Korreferat schließt mit einem zusammenfassenden „Urteil“. Möglich ist auch, dass Sie als Korreferent die anschließende Diskussion einleiten. Bitte erkundigen Sie sich hier nach den Vorgaben des Dozenten.

Beispiel: Zur Orientierung finden Sie im Folgenden zwei schriftlich ausgearbeitete Korreferate, welche einen wissenschaftlichen Artikel in einer Fachzeitschrift der VWL diskutieren.

Wolfram F. Richter, University of Dortmund, Korreferat zu Timothy J. Hatton: "Seeking asylum in Europe"

The paper studies the evolution that asylum flows and asylum policy have taken in the EU since the early 1980s. Applications for asylum have risen sharply since then and have reached a level of more than 300 000 per year in the second half of the 1990s. The evolution has provoked some heated policy responses that deserve to be examined from an economic perspective.

The paper has the potential to become a leading reference for the economics of asylum. This is so because it does an excellent job in collecting numbers that shed light on the issues at stake, in reviewing asylum policy in the EU and in studying the causes driving asylum flows and asylum policy. The author concludes that the long-run trend in the number of asylum seekers has been upward for reasons that are not well understood; that the number of applications to EU destinations would have ballooned by even more than they did if EU countries had not made the conditions for asylum

seekers less and less attractive; that the strict separation between asylum seekers and immigrants is debatable; and that policies should better be integrated at the EU level.

The plea for integrating asylum and immigration policies at the EU level has two parts. One is the adoption of a common EU policy. The other more radical part is the proposal to treat asylum seekers like potential migrants. The author expresses hopes that a policy of equal treatment helps to remove the stigma attached to asylum seekers as 'economic migrants'.

Although well appreciating the motivation underlying this proposal I find it difficult to accept it. My reservations are both theoretical and empirical. The proposal implicitly accepts the view that the majority of asylum seekers are not genuine refugees but economic migrants. The high rejection rates displayed in Table 4 seem to support this view. The econometric evidence, however, is less conclusive. If the view were correct, one would expect that a more liberal stance in immigration policy would help to reduce the number of asylum seekers. That would require, as the author acknowledges, a positive coefficient of 'immigration policy (t)' in Table 8. The coefficient, however, is negative and significant.

My theoretical reservations against treating asylum seekers as economic migrants are even stronger. Too little is known about the socio-economic characteristics of asylum seekers and how these compare with regular immigrants. The present study does not improve our knowledge in this respect. Given our poor knowledge about the socio-economic characteristics of asylum seekers one must fear that a policy of equal treatment is of little help to the majority of applicants. Instead the policy might only aggravate humanitarian problems as the most needy applicants will not be able to compete with regular immigrants.

Above all, a policy of equal treatment runs the risk of undermining public support for asylum policy. The proposal makes insufficient allowance for an important difference between asylum and immigration. As a rule people migrate with a long-term perspective. Immigrants have much in common with investors. They have to accumulate specific knowledge of language and other skills. Such an investment only pays in the long run. Asylum seekers are in a different position. They are the victims of conflict and violence which give them little chance to make planned choices. Asylum seekers are in search of transitory assistance. Such transitoriness is the basis of the strong support that a policy of hosting asylum seekers enjoys by the broad public. Expectations are strong that asylum seekers will eventually return to their home country when the causes of flight no longer exist. If asylum seekers are treated as migrants, such expectations are no longer well founded. Hence I would fear that the policy of equal treatment only impairs the public support for hosting asylum seekers.

Instead of treating asylum seekers as immigrants I would plead for greater consistency in removing applicants if applications are rejected or if the causes of asylum have gone. It is certainly unsatisfactory to learn that three quarters of applications are eventually rejected and that removals and voluntary departures were less than half the number of rejected claims.

There is another conceptual difference between asylum and migration suggesting separate policies. Immigration augments the labour force and the factors of production. A liberal policy would abstain

from intervening in migration flows. This is obviously different with asylum. By its nature asylum is a humanitarian disaster, the control of which, as the author acknowledges, has much in common with an international public good. Policy co-ordination is needed (1) to ensure an efficient provision in the destination countries and (2) to fight the causes of asylum in the source countries. The latter objective is one that more than anything else requires a clear separation of asylum and migration policies. The question is not only how many applicants to accept. The question is more how to divide resources between the hosting of asylum seekers and the fighting of the causes of asylum. In my understanding the Kosovo conflict is a good example for illustrating the trade off. Nato intervened not because Yugoslavia violated human rights as such but because there were increasing numbers of asylum seekers flowing into the EU. The cost of hosting asylum seekers threatened to exceed the cost of military intervention.

Box 4 is an attempt to model the costs and benefits of hosting asylum seekers in a two-country framework. The costs, $c r_i$, are assumed to be proportional in country i 's acceptance rate r_i . Marginal costs, c , are independent of $i = 1, 2$ which makes good sense if they are to reflect pure costs of subsistence. The benefits of accepting asylum seekers are portrayed by some concave function $B_i(r_1 + \lambda r_2)$. By stipulating $\lambda < 1$ the author suggests that a country values the number of refugees accepted at home more highly than those accepted abroad. I must confess that I do not understand why this should be the case. I well see that the combination of $\lambda = 1$ with some parameter c that is constant in i has an unattractive implication: The acceptance rate r_i is no longer uniquely determined by the maximization of national welfare. However, I would prefer a different strategy for solving this technical problem. I would prefer to set $\lambda = 1$ and to add a term to the cost function capturing country-specific 'costs of congestion', $c r_i + d_i r_i^2 / 2$. See Figure 11.




Figure 11. Marginal costs and benefits of hosting asylum seekers

According to the model acceptance rates are strategic complements. If more asylum seekers are accepted abroad the problem becomes less pressing and fewer asylum seekers are accepted by the home country. This sounds like a highly plausible effect, yet still the empirical evidence is not too convincing. According to Table 11, a one point increase in the policy index of other EU countries increases the country's share by 0.44% but the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.

Hence the empirical evidence does not allow one to make a very strong argument for harmonizing asylum policies. Obviously more work has to be done in order to understand the causes of asylum flows. This paper is only a first step, though an important one.

Source: Richter, Wolfram F. (2004): Seeking Asylum in Europe: Discussion, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 19, Iss. 38, pp. 52-54.

Riccardo Faini, Università di Roma Tor Vergata and CEPR, Korreferat zu Timothy J. Hatton: "Seeking asylum in Europe"

During the 1990s, EU policies toward asylum seekers have become increasingly restrictive. Yet, the number of asylum seekers has grown exponentially. Is there a puzzle here? Or is policy hopelessly ineffective? The excellent paper by Tim Hatton shows that the supposed puzzle disappears once account is taken of the endogeneity of policy. Indeed, it was the surge in the number of applications for asylum that prompted policy-makers throughout the EU to tighten up their policy stance. Policy was effective in stemming, but not reversing, the surge in asylum applications.

Yet the asylum seekers puzzle reappears under a different guise. If it is true, as the paper indeed shows, that tight policies were quite effective in curbing applications for asylum, what explains their surge? Not relative economic conditions between sending and receiving countries: the rise of unemployment in destination countries together with the fall in the ratio of the GDP per capita between destination and source countries (with the only exception of Eastern Europe) worked toward a reduction in the number of applications. Neither do the trends in armed conflicts or in (the lack of) democratic rights provide much of an explanation in this respect. The former reached a peak between 1984 and 1992 and then declined substantially, and cannot therefore account for the surge in asylum application during the 1990s. Similarly, the improvement in political rights is found to be associated with a reduction in the number of asylum applications. To account for the massive rise in asylum applications, one needs therefore to look somewhere else. A simple time trend would easily do the job, but it would yield no more than a measure of our ignorance. A complementary and more ingenious route, which is indeed taken by Hatton, is to rely on the presence of network effects. In the end, it is reassuring to find, as the paper does, that, once account is taken of the boosting effects of the existing stock of asylum seekers on additional applications, the coefficient on the time trend falls dramatically and most of the surge is now accounted for. Unfortunately, the time trend is still significant. Moreover, it plays a key role in explaining the distribution of asylum applications among EU countries.

An alternative explanation to the rise of asylum applications would focus on the links between immigration and asylum applications. First, tight immigration policies in destination countries may have led would-be migrants to try their chance as asylum seekers. Second, the overall stock of foreigners, rather than simply the stock of asylum seekers, may have helped establish deeper channels of migration, thereby boosting the number of asylum applications. Third, the rise in immigration following the upheaval in Eastern Europe may have undermined the willingness in destination countries to take on more asylum seekers, thereby contributing to the tightening of

asylum policies. It is a pity that the paper provides only limited evidence, mostly because of data limitations, on the links between asylum and immigration policies and flows. This is an area where future research may yield some valuable dividends.

The policy section of the paper offers two main messages. First, EU countries should co-ordinate their asylum policies, to allow for the positive humanitarian externality that accepting one refugee confers to individuals in other countries. The presence of a positive externality means that, in the absence of co-ordination, too few asylum seekers will be accepted. This conclusion is bound to be quite controversial, particularly in light of the growing restrictiveness of asylum seeking policies throughout the EU. Moreover, the fact that in the past European policy-makers were unaware, or did not take into account, the effect of migrant networks in boosting future asylum requests imply that too many, not too few, asylum seekers were accepted. The net effect is therefore uncertain.

Even more controversial is the second policy proposal to integrate policies toward economic immigrants and asylum seekers. It is designed, in the author's words, 'to reduce the stigma attached to asylum seekers as economic immigrants'. This is not a proposal that should be discarded at the outset. Yet, the evidence to support it is thin. The paper offers no evidence that public opinion attitudes are more hostile toward asylum seekers compared to economic immigrants. Unless this is true, any attempt to integrate asylum seekers and general immigration policies may backfire by confusing the moral obligation to accept those that escape from violence and persecution with the economic and demographic motivations that underlie immigration policies. Moreover, there is no guarantee that such integration would help speed the processing of the requests for asylum, thereby adding to the resentment of local population against 'bogus' requests. Finally, as noticed earlier, our understanding of the links between asylum and immigration policies is very limited at best. More research is needed before we can consider integrating these two sets of policies.

In the end, we can only agree with the author that 'Europe must live up to its humanitarian ideals'. Unfortunately, there are some ominous signs that the stance toward immigrants is hardening. Polls throughout Europe indicate that public opinion would favour a reduction in the number of foreigners. One senior Italian Minister, Umberto Bossi, was recently quoted as saying that 'The navy must use its cannons to protect Italy's borders'. There is still a long way to go to convince European policy-makers that immigration can generate non-negligible benefits to the host country and that they must live up to the continent's humanitarian ideals.

Source: Faini, Riccardo (2004): Seeking Asylum in Europe: Discussion, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 19, Iss. 38, pp. 54-56.